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COMMUNIST TACTICS AMONG VETERANS' GROUPS

(TESTIMONY OF JOHN T. PACE)

HEARING

REFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGKESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 13, 1951

Printed for the use of tl e Committee on Un-American Activity

MARVSftt COLLEGE LIBRARY

DEPOSITED BY THE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DLC 20 1951

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1!)")!

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HEARINGS ON AMERICAN ASPECTS OF THE RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

(Based on testimony of Mitsusada Yoshikawa and Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby)

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES HOUSE OE REPRESENTATIVES

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGEESS

FIRST SESSION

AUGUST 9, 22, AND 23, 1951

Printed for the use of the Committee on Un-American Activities

HARVARD C0LLE6E LIBRARY

DEPOSITEB BY THE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DtC 10 1951

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 90929 WASHINGTON : 1951

COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JOHN S. WOOD, Georgia, Chairman FRANCIS E. WALTER, Pennsylvania HAROLD H. VELDE, Illinois

MORGAN M. MOULDER, Missouri BERNARD W. KEARNEY, New York

CLYDE DOYLE, California DONALD L. JACKSON, California

JAMES B. FRAZIER, Jr., Tennessee CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan

Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., Counsel Louis J. Russell, Senior Investigator John W. Carrington, Clerk of Committee Raphael I. Nixon, Director of Research II

CONTENTS

Pace

August '•>. 1951, testimony of Mitsusada Yoshikawa 1134

Augusl 22, 1951, testimony of Maj. (leu. Charles Willoughby _ 11(51

August 23, 1951, testimony of —

Courtney E. Owens 11H5

Maj. Gen. Charles Andrew Willoughby 1198

in

HEARINGS ON AMERICAN ASPECTS OF THE RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

(Based on Testimony of Mitsnsada Yoshikawa and Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willonghby)

THURSDAY, AUGUST 9, 1951

United States House of Representatives,

Committee on Un-American Activities,

Washington, D. C.

PUBLIC HEARING

The Committee on Un-American Activities met pursuant to call at 10 : 30 a. m. in room 220, Old House Office Building, Hon. Francis E. Walter presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives Francis E. Walter, Clyde Doyle, Bernard W. Kearney, Donald L. Jackson, and Charles E. Potter (appearance as noted in transcript).

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Courtney E. Owens, investigator; Raphael I. Nixon, director of research; John W. Carrington, clerk ; and A. S. Poore, editor.

Mr. Walter. The committee will come to order. Is the interpreter here, Mr. Kuroda ?

Mr. Kuroda. Yes.

Mr. Walter. Will you stand and raise your right hand, please.

Do you solemnly swear you will truly and accurately interpret into the Japanese language the questions propounded by the committee, and that you will make a true and accurate interpretation in the English language of the replies made by the witness in the Japanese language, so help you God \

Mr. Kuroda. I do.

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, before swearing in the witness, may I suggest that the }roung lady there be sworn in as a monitor. Due to the difficulties in translation of finding the exact equivalent in English of the Japanese, it has been the general practice for a monitor to be present also, to give her interpretation in the event of a difference.

Mr. Walter. I think she should be sworn as an interpreter.

Do you solemnly swear you will truly and accurately interpret into the Japanese language the questions propounded in English by the committee, and that you will make a true and accurate interpretation in the English language of the answers made by the witness in the Japanese language, so help j^ou God?

Mrs. Katsuyo L. Takesiiita. I do.

Mr. Walter. Will the witness please stand. [To Mr. Kuroda.] Repeat this, please.

1133

1134 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

I swear that in answering all questions propounded to me in the course of this hearing. I will state the truth according to my con- science, adding nothing and concealing nothing.

Mr. Yoshikawa (through Mr. Kuroda). Yes.

TESTIMONY OF MITSTJSADA YOSHIKAWA

(Through the Interpreter, Andrew Y. Kuroda, Assisted by the Monitor, Mrs. Katsuyo L. Takeshita)

Mr. Tavenner. Will you state your full name, please I

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yoshikawa, Mitsusada.1

Mr. Tavenner. Your name is Yoshikawa, Mitsusada \

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Yoshikawa, you are at present in the United States on a mission of the Japanese Government, I believe; is that correct ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

Mr. Tavenner. You are a native of Japan?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

Mr. Tavenner. When and where were you born ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. I was born in Tokyo on January 16, 1907.

Mr. Tavenner. What position do you now hold with the Japanese Government ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. I am the chief of the special investigation bureau of the attorney general's office.

Mr. Tavenner. How long have you held that position ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. For about 3 years.

Mr. Tavenner. What other official positions have you held with the | Japanese Government ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. I was a prosecutor and also an official in the Ministry of Justice. I was holding those offices concurrently.

Mr. Tavenner. I notice that the translation given was prosecutor. Have you held the position of procurator under the Japanese Government?

Mr. Yoshikawta. Yes. It is officially translated as procurator in- stead of prosecutor.

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, according to An Outline of the Japanese Judiciary, by Masataro Miyake, published in Tokyo in 1935, page 4, a procurator has the following function :

To conduct searches, institute prosecutions, and supervise the execution of judgments in criminal cases and to act as representative of the public interest in civil cases of public concern.

Mr. Walter. It sounds like duties of the nature of those of the Attorney General and the head of the FBI.

Mr. Tavenner. The duties are even broader than that. Procurators are attached to district and appeals courts in Japan, as well as to the supreme court. The Library of Congress likens a procurator to a dis- trict attorney in the United States, but having much more power than a district attorney.

I would like to ask the witness if that is his understanding of the duties of a procurator.

(Representative Charles E. Potter entered hearing room.)

1 In Japanese, it is customary to give last name first.

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1135

Mr. Kuboda. He says that what is written here is right. However, he is not quite sure what it means, having much more power than a district attorney.

Mr. Tavenner. When you -were procurator, were you attached to the criminal courts of Tokyo ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. For a certain period I was.

Mr. Tavenner. What was that period '.

Mi-. Yoshikawa. 1 don't remember exactly, but from around Sep- tember 1938 for about 8 years.

Mr. Tavenner. During the period you were procurator, were you assigned to the case of Richard Sorge in the performance of your duties as a procurator?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

Mr. Tavenner. Will you describe very briefly the nature of your assignment to the case of Richard Sorge?

Mr. Yoshikawa. A group

Mr. Tavenner. Just a moment, please. May I suggest that from this point on the interpreter interpret in shorter passages.

Mr. Yoshikawa. A group of procurators was organized to make search and prosecute this case under Mr. Toneo Nakamura. Mr. Naka- mura was chief of a division of the Tokyo district criminal court, the prosecution bureau, and under Mr. Nakamura I was appointed as the one primarily in charge of the prosecution. There were two persons appointed, and I was one of the two, and I was in charge of the prose- cution of this case, and I used several procurators and engaged in the search.

Mr. Tavenner. When you speak of being engaged in search, do you mean engaged in investigation of the case ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. I personally conducted the investigation, and also I appointed other procurators to help conduct this prosecution, and also I ordered the police to help in the investigation.

Mr. Tavenner. Will you state, please, what led up to the arrest of Richard Sorge?

Mr. Yoshikawa. I remember, I think it was around the spring of 1941, a woman called Tomo Kitabayashi came to Tokyo from America.

We received information that this woman Kitabayashi was doing some spy activities.

We ordered police to proceed in investigation.

Kitabayashi went to Wakayama.

We couldn't get any evidence against her.

But in October of that year — that is, 1941 — T recall we received cer- tain information, and therefore we arrested Kitabayashi.

Kitabayashi denied that she was a spy. However, she stated that a person called Yotokti Miyagi. who came from America, was doing some kind of spy activities.

Mr. Tavenner. May I interrupt you at that point. Was Yotoku Miyagi an American citizen?

Mr. Yoshikawa. I am not sure, but I think lie was an American citizen.

Mr. Tavenner. Proceed, please.

Mr. Yoshikawa. We arrested Mi vagi and investigated him. He vehemently denied he was a spy. However, when w7e searched his house we discovered an odd object.

It was an English document.

1136 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

It was a document conducted by the South Manchurian Railway Co., and it was regarded as secret material to the Japanese Govern- ment.

We thought it was strange that an artist had such kind of docu- ment.

Mr. Tavenner. Miy agi was an artist ; is that correct %

Mr. Yoshikawa. He was an artist, and he had some reputation as an artist in Tokyo. He painted American-style paintings.

Miyagi continued to deny that he was a spy. However, a certain thing happened.

He was being investigated on the second floor of the Tsukiji police station in Tokyo.

He attempted to commit suicide by jumping out of the window.

He wasn't injured, nor he died.

Police jumped after him and captured him.

After this incident, Miyagi began to state.

He began to state about a very important spy group ; he began to state about the activities of a very important spy group.

Then he described the person who had closest connection with Miyagi was Hidemi Ozaki, who was regarded as the brains of the Konoye Cabinet.

Mr. Tavenner. Excuse me. I did not understand what he said about Ozaki's connection with the Konoye Cabinet.

Mr. Yoshikawa. Premier Konoye had around him a group of brain trusters or advisers, and they formed a society called Breakfast Club, and Ozaki was one of the most brilliant advisers of Konoye.

As an illustration of his brilliancy, this can be stated : When the Marco Polo incident occurred, Ozaki said that the incident would become larger, extend larger. At that time people were confused whether the incident would be localized or extended. However, the development showed that Ozaki's prophecy was right, and his reputa- tion increased.

(Representative Bernard W. Kearney left hearing room.)

Mr. Tavenner. Then I understand Ozaki was very close to Prince Konoye, who occupied what position at that time ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

Mr. Tavenner. But what position did Prince Konoye hold at that time in the Japanese Government ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. He was the Prime Minister at that time.

Mr. Tavenner. Now if you will proceed.

Mr. Kuroda. He asked if he may smoke.

Mr. Walter. Yes, indeed.

Mr. Yoshikawa. So we were very surprised when we found that Ozaki was involved in this case. We were not sure we could proceed in this case because of Ozaki's closeness to the Prime Minister. Then we found that behind Ozaki there were several foreigners also.

Moreover, among those foreigners we found there was Richard Sorge, who was the highest adviser to German Ambassador Ott, although he didn't have any official position.

My colleague procurator, Tamazawa, investigated Miyagi.

I examined the content of the investigation.

And finally we arrested Ozaki.

I investigated Ozaki personally.

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1137

I examined Ozaki at the Meguro police station, and he con fessed t he same day.

He disclosed the name of Shigeru Mizuno. Therefore we arrested Mizuno.

I began to examine Ozaki in detail.

We came to the conclusion we should arrest the foreigners, based on the examination of Miyagi and Ozaki.

The Konoye Cabinet was pushed into a difficult position and finally resigned.

It was before the forming of the Tojo Cabinet.

We were not particularly taking advantage of this situation, but we arrested Sorge and Klansen and Vonkelitch.

I may correct my statement here. Tojo was scheduled to become the head of the Cabinet, and it was known that Mr. Iwamura, who was the Minister of Justice in the Konoye Cabinet, would stay in the new Cabinet; therefore, we received the approval of Mr. Iwamura and started arresting these people.

(Representative Clyde Doyle left hearing room.)

Mr. Tavenxek. With regard to the people who were arrested at that time, I want to be certain we have their names listed correctly. You spoke of Klausen. Is that Max Klausen, K-1-a-u-s-e-n?

Mr. Yosiiikawa. Yes.

Mr. Tavexxer. And the person referred to as Voukelitch was Branko Voukelitch, B-r-a-n-k-o V-o-u-k-e-l-i-t-c-h.

Mr. Yoshikawa. Branko de Voukelitch, yes.

Mr. Tavenxer. You mentioned the name of Mizuno. Is that the same person as S-h-i-g-e-r-u M-i-z-u-n-o.

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

Mr. Tavexxer. What is the first name of Ozaki ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. H-i-d-e-m-i.

Mr. Tavexxer. We have in the record of the Sorge trial the trans- lation of Ozaki's first name as H-o-z-u-m-i.

Mr. Yoshikawa. I don't know, but we called him Hidemi.

Mr. Tavexxer. There was only one Ozaki involved in the Sorge case?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

Mr. Tavexner. Very well. Proceed, please.

Mr. Yoshikawa. We arrested Max Klausen, his wife, Anna Klausen, and Voukelitch, and conducted a house search of these people.

What we wondered most was whether we could discover a radio transmitter.

Fortunately, we could discover the radio transmitter, and we im- pounded it. And also-we found coded messages and messages which were to be coded, and also a code book, which was a German statistical yearbook.

We were afraid that Sorge might shoot at us with a pistol. We put Sorge's house under surveillance for several days. That morning a person from the German Embassy visited Sorge. After that person left we went in and arrested Sorge.

When he was arrested, Sorge insisted that he was a Nazi and held a very high position as an adviser in the German Embassy.

Mr. Walter. About when was that?

Mr. Yoshikawa. In Tokyo.

Mr. Walter. When ? About what date ?

1138 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

Mr. Yoshikawa. I think it was November 1941.

Mr. Walter. Did your investigation disclose that at that time both Germany and Russia knew of plans to make the attack at Pearl Harbor ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. It wasn't disclosed during the examination.

Mr. Walter. Was it subsequently learned, as a result of these ar- rests and the investigation, that both Germany and Russia were informed of the plans for the attack?

Mr. Yoshikawa. The Pearl Harbor attack did not come up.

I would like to mention about intelligence activities later.

Sorge was brought to the Toriisaka police station nearby.

After a physical examination, Sorge and Voukelitch were brought to a Tokyo detention house.

The following day the procurator started to investigate.

Mr. Walter. May I interrupt at that point? Did the investigation disclose that the Japanese forces contemplated attacks and that this fact was known by the German and Russian Governments ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. I am not sure exactly.

Since you asked me that question again, I will mention this. Sorge informed Russia 2 months before Germany attacked Russia about the German readiness of attacking. Sorge informed Russia that 150 divi- sions of the German Army were massed at the border, and the German high command was of the opinion that Petrograd, or Leningrad, would fall within 2 months.

Mr. Tavenner. Proceed, please.

Mr. Yoshikawa. In connection with the investigation of Sorge, Klausen, and Voukelitch, I personally investigated Sorge.

As I said, I was in charge of the investigation of Sorge, and Mr. Hiroshi Iwo was in charge of Klausen. Another procurator was appointed to investigate Voukelitch. When I started the investiga- tion of Sorge he vehemently denied.

After one week, and I think it was Saturday evening, Sorge finally confessed.

He wrote on a sheet of paper in German that "I have been an inter- national Communist since 1925 and I am still," and then he confessed.

By that time Klausen and Voukelitch also confessed. This is the process up to the prosecution.

If you have any questions.

Mr. Tavenner. Was there any coercion of any character used in obtaining the confession?

Mr. Yoshikawa. No.

Klausen first confessed that he was a spy for the Red Army.

And Voukelitch confessed that he was a spy for the Comintern.

And so a very serious ensuing search took place.

We couldn't tell the nature of this spy group until Sorge confessed.

I told Sorge that Miyagi and Ozaki confessed and showed evidence.

While we were repeating this, he confessed himself.

I have an opinion why Richard Sorge confessed.

The first reason is this: He thought that his arrest was too late. Sorge and his group had almost finished their spy activities and they thought they were very successful. A few days before the arrest Klausen and Voukelitch met at the house of Sorge and they were won- dering why Ozaki failed to show up. They were talking that since

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1139

their activities were almost through they were going to get out of Japan and by all means go to Germany to engage in spy activities there.

Mr. Walter. Did he know of a radio message that wss sent in October?

Mr. Kuroda. Mr. Chairman, when you said "he" you mean Mr. Yoshikawa (

Mr. Walter. Yes.

Mr. Yoshikawa. 1 don't remember very exactly.

Mr. Walter. Does he know about this message as a result of his invest igat ion :

The American-Japanese talks have entered upon their final stage. In Konoye's opinion they will end successfully if Japan decreases her forces in China and French Indochina and gives up her plan of building eight naval and air bases in French Indochina. If America refuses to compromise by the middle of October, Japan will attack America, the Malay countries, Singapore, and Sumatra. She will not attack Borneo because it is within reach of Singapore and Manila. However, there will be war only if the talks break down, and there is no doubt that Japan is doing her best to bring them to a successful conclusion, even at the expense of her German ally.

I think I had better show you the message and ask if you know about this message [handing message to the witness and Mr. Kuroda].

Mr. Kuroda.. He says that he recalls about this message.

Mr. Walter. So that there is no doubt but that Russia knew in advance of the plans on the part of Japan for aggression?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes; and also, Russia would probably welcome a Japanese attack, instead of going north, going south.

Mr. Walter. Exactly.

Mr. Yoshikawa. Along that line, Sorge was doing certain political maneuvering in addition to his spy activities.

Ozaki was also cooperating with Sorge.

Mr. Walter. In other words, spies paid by the Russian Government were using whatever influence they had in order to promote Japanese aggression against the United States and the British ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. To a certain extent.

(Representative Clyde Doyle returned to hearing room.)

Mr. Yoshikawa. In August of that year, 1,300,000 soldiers were mobilized in Japan, and Sorge was very much interested in obtaining the information to which direction, in which area, this number of soldiers would be used.

Mr. Potter. In other words, he was anxious. I assume, to have the troops go south rather than north toward the Manchurian border; is that right?

Mr. Yoshikawa. He was very much anxious, and tried to get the information.

Miyagi frequented the eating and drinking places in Tokyo and tried to approach soldiers and tried to get information where they were headed. Ozaki tried to get the information from the higher echelon of the Government. However, the soldiers were wearing summer clothes instead of winter, so they thought the soldiers were headed toward the south instead of the north.

Mr. Potter. Did Sorge, posing as a German or Nazi, use his in- fluence on various policy makers in Japan to carry out the Communist wish to move the soldiers to the south as a threat to the British and

1140 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

the United States, rather than to the north, which might be a threat to Russia ? Did he use his influence to formulate that policy ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. I think Sorge didn't have much connection with the high officials of the Japanese Government. What connection he had was rather with the army general staff of Japan.

Before the Russian-German war started high military officers came to Tokyo from Berlin.

And also an emissary of the German Admiral Canaries, who was in charge of antiespionage activities, came to Tokyo.

When those people came from Germany to Japan they met, of course, Ambassador Ott, and they also met Sorge.

And they went to the Japanese Army general staff, the Japanese Army high officials, to see them with Sorge.

Ambassador Ott went to the Japanese Army general staff showing the German plan of attacking Singapore, and told the Japanese that if they followed that plan Singapore would fall very easily. At that time Sorge was an assistant to the German Ambassador.

Mr. Tavenner. And that plan was prepared in the German Em- bassy, was it not, by Von Kretchner, and at that time all the German attaches were recalled for the purpose of that study?

Mr. Yoshikawa. I haven't heard about it.

Mr. Tavenner. The plan that was presented was a plan for over- land attack, just as it did occur finally?

Mr. Yoshikawa. According to Sorge's confession, the Japanese staff officers were not particularly eager to accept that plan right away.

Mr. Walter. May I interrupt at that point ? I would like to get clear in my mind the connection between some of these individuals. Sorge and Ozaki were very close, were they not ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Were more than close.

Mr. Walter. They were both Communist agents; both agents of Russia; were they not?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Sorge started to use Ozaki as his assistant in Shanghai. At that time Sorge received approval from Russia. In Tokyo, too, when Ozaki was used in the spy ring in Japan, Sorge received the approval from Russia, and Ozaki was the closest assistant to Sorge. Ozaki was in a secret section of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

Mr. Walter. And Ozaki was also at that time one of the leading Communists out there and was the political adviser to Prince Konoye ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

Mr. Tavenner. At the time Gen. Eugene Ott, German Ambassador to Japan, along with Richard Sorge, attempted to sell a plan of attack on Singapore to the Japanese general staff, do you know whether General Ott had taken that plan to Ribbentrop in Germany, where discussions were held between Ribbentrop and Matsuoka, the Japanese Foreign Minister?

Mr. Yoshikawa. I am not familiar with what you state. However, Soi'ge sent important messages concerning Matsuoka.

Before Matsuoka went to Europe, Prince Konoye told Matsuoka that it would be all right to conclude a commercial treaty with Russia, however, don't do anything in Germany.

That message was sent by Sorge, therefore Stalin was waiting for Matsuoka.

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1141

What Matsuoka got from Stalin in the form of a treaty was actually more than what Konoye was expecting, however.

That was the information which Sorge sent to Moscow in regard to the trip of Matsuoka.

And so Matsuoka had only a hearty welcome in Germany and not hing more.

So 1 heard.

Mr. Tavenner. The records of the conversations between Hitler and Matsuoka and Oshiina were introduced in the trial of Tojo, were they not ?

Mr. Yosiiikawa. I don't remember exactly.

Mr. Walter. Then, if 1 understand correctly, even after or at the moment that Germany attacked Russia, Russia was concerned with endeavoring to have the United States become involved in hostilities wit h Japan \

Mr. Yosiiikawa. Yes. from the fact that German Ambassador Ott showed plans of attacking Singapore even prior to the German attack on Russia.

Mr. Walter. They probably were still concerned in endeavoring to have us involved somewhere throughout the entire conspiracy?

Mr. Yosiiikawa. From these facts I could say that Sorge was pri- marily interested in spy work and secondarily he wTas engaged in political maneuvering, trying to divert Japanese attention to the south instead of to the north.

Mr. Walter. In other words, he was acting in a dual capacity ?

Mi-. Yosiiikawa. He was telling the Japanese that the Russian Army was strong, and also Siberia was rather barren, so Japan could not get anything from Siberia, but in the south Japan could get im- portant resources, and also it is easier to attack the south. That is what he was trying to convince the Japanese people.

Mr. Potter. Y^ou stated that when the representatives of the Ger- man Government visited Japan with this plan to move the Japanese Army south, that there was some reluctance on the part of Japanese military officials to accept that plan. Do you know what the official position of the Japanese military was concerning wdiat they should do with the troops? Did they envision sending their troops north?

Mr. Yosiiikawa. I haven't investigated the Japanese Army Gener- al Stan1', so I don't know.

Either right before or right after the war between Germany and Russia started, a secret emissary came from Germany and, with Am- bassador Ott. went to the Japanese General Staff to persuade the Jap- anese Army to attack Russia.

The Japanese General "Staff replied that when the German Army reached the Danube line, the Japanese Army might attack Russia.

Information like this centering around the German Embassy w7as lost in fire.

Mr. Potter. Did the investigation you conducted bring out evidence to determine whose idea it was to strike at Pearl Harbor? Was that sponsored by Germany, or by the Communists, or was that the Japanese Army's own policy?

Mr. Yoshikawa. That didn't come out in the investigation. Mr. Tavenner. What was the relationship between General Ott and Richard Sorge after the arrest of Richard Sorjre?

1142 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

Mr. Yoshikawa. Ambassador Ott and Mrs. Ott were very surprised and became very angry and put pressure on Tojo.

Ambassador Ott asked, through the Minister of Justice, to let the Ambassador see Sorge.

We were very much embarrassed, because the investigation was continuing at that time.

Fortunately, in 1 week Sorge confessed, and so after his confession I told him that the Ambassador "is anxious to see you. Would you like to see him?"

Sorge replied first that he would not like to see him.

Sorge told me that though their political opinions were different, they were personally good friends, and so I told him, "If I were you, I would see him. A Japanese in this kind of situation would see him to say the last farewell." Sorge said, "Then I will see him."

So I told the Minister of Justice about that, and Ambassador Ott, with Marchiter, Stahmer, and others, came to see Sorge.

After a brief interview, Sorge told Ott that this would be the last time he would see him.

Ott was stunned and changed his countenance.

So we closed the interview and took Ott in another room. Ott said that he would not do anything concerning this case any more, but asked us to finish the investigation as quick as possible and let him know about the results.

However, it appeared that the German Embassy tried to put pres- sure upon us, using the Japanese left-wing people.

And so we made a copy of the first chapter of the investigation of the Sorge case and sent it to the German Embassy through the Minister of Justice.

Mr. Tavenner. May I ask a question at that point before you go into a further discussion of that matter ?

Did information come to you, in the course of this investigation, to indicate whether or not General Eugene Ott, the German Am- bassador, knew of the Communist affiliation of Richard Sorge?

Mr. Yoshikawa. No. Ambassador Ott was completely deceived.

Mr. Tavenner. What was the result of General Ott being deceived by Sorge, with regard to his relations with his own government?

Mr. Yoshikawa. I think if Ott had gone home he would have been killed.

Mr. Tavenner. He was immediately replaced by Stahmer as Am- bassador to Japan, was he not?

Mr. Yoshikawa. That is correct. And instead of going home, Ott went to Peking and stayed in China.

This is not very reliable, but we heard, we had information, that after the death of Ott, his wife went to Russia.

Mr. Waeter. Did Sorge at any time give you information concern- ing the extent of Communist espionage in the United States?

Mr. Yoshikawa. lie did not,.

Sorge made comments on the American Communist Party.

Mr. Walter. What were his comments?

Mi-. Yoshikawa. The American Communist Party, according to Sorge, his comment was that the American Communist Party had many people of different racial backgrounds, with different lan- guages— Italians, Germans, and Japanese — and one language could not be used; but in the course of time it may become stronger.

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1143

Mr. Tavenner. Prior to the time of obtaining the confession of Sorge, did you show him, and use in obtaining his confession, the Gorman Statistical Year book which had been used as a code in the transmission of messages by Sorge?

Mr. Yoshikawa. I didn't show it personally, hut I told him that Klauscn confessed the fact that the German Statistical Yearbook was use I as the code book.

Mr. Walter. The committee will stand in recess until -2 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at L2:25 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. in. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee reconvened at 2: 10 p. m., Representatives Francis

E. Walter and Clyde Doyle being present, Mr. Walter presiding.)

TESTIMONY OF MITSUSADA YOSHIKAWA— Resumed

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Yoshikawa, at the time of adjournment T was asking about the knowledge that Richard Sorge had of the code that was used in the transmission of secret messages at the time of his confession.

I now want to ask you whether he was also familial' with the exist- ence of the radio equipment that had been used for that purpose prior to giving his confession \

Mr. Kuroda. I didn't quite get the question.

Mr. Tavenner. 1 will break the question down.

Prior to Mr. Sorge giving his confession, was he told about the seizure of the radio equipment, or was he shown the radio equipment which had been seized \

Mr. Yoshikawa. Before the confession we didn't show any material to him. Therefore, we didn't show the radio equipment which was impounded.

May I continue?

There was an argument among the procurators because he didn't confess, an argument that we should show the radio equipment to him; but before we came to the point of showing the equipment, he confessed.

Mr. Tavenxer. Had you advised him that you had seized and im- pounded the radio equipment (

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

Mr. Tavenner. And that was before he made his confession?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

Mr. Tavenner. Will you proceed now and tell the committee how the confession was given?

Mr. Yoshikawa. I gave the committee an account about it before, but I will speak to you a little further.

I told you before that they were almost finished their work in Japan, and they had a sort of sense of relief after the successful completion of their job.

Many people were arrested at the same time.

And those people confessed, one by one, before Sorge did.

Various evidences came up — radio equipment, code book, coded messages, and so forth.

1144 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

As for the code book, it was foimd in a study of the house of Klausen.

It consisted of three volumes.

I happened to pick them up and I found that there was a mark of much use.

And the figures of general statistics were there.

I immediately figured that it was a source book for the code.

In order to make decoding difficult, they added the figures on that page on the coded message.

So after we impounded the German Statistical Yearbook we asked Klausen about it, and Klausen confessed it was the key book for the code. He confessed it before Sorge did.

I told Sorge about those facts and he finally confessed.

We had no program at that time. We were wondering whether Sorge was really a spy for Germany and using Communists in Japan but actually spying for the Nazi regime in Germany. That was one question.

The second question was whether Sorge was a double spy for both Berlin and Moscow.

The third question was whether he was really a spy for Moscow, pretending to be a Nazi.

Therefore, we examined Sorge without preconceived opinion.

We took a very cautious attitude.

There was another question. If he were a spy for Moscow, we didn't know whether he was a spy for the fourth section, as Klausen said, or whether he was a spy for the Comintern, as Voukelitch said.

Mr. Tavenner. When you speak of the fourth section, do you mean the fourth section of the Red army ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

Mr. Tavenner. That was the intelligence section of the Red army ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

Mr. Tavenner. Proceed.

Mr. Yoshikawa. Therefore, I never crossed him to get his confession.

I asked his explanation as evidences came up.

So, finally, at the end of the first week, he confessed, but at that time I was not expecting that he would confess.

About 4 o'clock my colleague, prosecutor Tamazawa, and a police- men went to see if his health would stand any further investigation, since that was Saturday.

Thus he finally confessed. Before he confessed he asked for a piece of paper and pencil.

And, as I told you before, he wrote down in German that since 1925 he was an international Communist, and handed it to me.

And he took off his coat.

And he rose and cried: "I have never been defeated since 1 became an international Communist. This is the first time that I was beaten." he said.

Mr. Walter. At that time did he say that Ozaki was also an inter- national Communist ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Sorge was quite exhausted at that time, and so Mr. Tamazawa asked him whether he would continue investigation the following day. Sorge wanted to be continued on Monday. So

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1 I 45

he didn'l say that Ozaki was also an international Communisl at that time.

Sorge, generally speaking, admitted that Ozaki and Miyagi and others were also international Communists.

And he consented that be would talk about it Monday.

(Representative Charles E. Potter entered hearing room.)

Mr. Yosmik.wya. On Monday, from 9 in the morning until '■'> in the afternoon, the police conducted investigation under my supervision.

However, Sorge asked to be investigated personally by Mr. Yoshikawa.

So from :) o'clock in the afternoon until night I conducted the invest igat ion by mysel I.

And Sorge responded to my questions.

The police talked to me before the investigation, and alter the in- vestigation they reported about the content of the investigation and received direction from me.

When the policemen were conducting the investigation of Sorge, Klausen, and Voukelitch, I went along and kept my eyes on the police- men on their way of conducting the investigation.

Before starting the investigation I talked with Sorge about the outline of the investigation.

I showed him the points I would cover in the investigation.

And Sorge also offered his wishes.

And when he offered any points, I adopted those points which were helpful in the investigation.

My German and English are both broken. I speak broken in Ger- man and English. It took time to conduct the investigation, but Sorge didn't want to have an interpreter. I asked him why. and he said an interpreter would make the story difficult.

So, whenever we came into difficulty in understanding, we used a sheet of paper and Sorge wrote on the paper and explained.

When we decided about the outline of the investigation, he took a piece of paper and. by means of the paper, he explained about those points. When I read what he wrote on the paper I asked him ques- tions when I didn't understand: then he made further explanation on those points.

After several days. Sorge typed what we talked, in my presence. He corrected misprints. I read what he typed by aid of a dictionary.

At times the typing was not neat and not sufficient, so I asked him to retype. He offered to retype himself, since it was nor neat and not sufficient. Thus the typed story increased.

Either March or April the investigation was completed.

On various important points I received special explanations from him. There were some points where I could not get full explana- tion. When the investigation was completed, Sorge took a sheet of paper and typed that this investigation was conducted by Mr. Yoshikawa. and signed his name.

Then an official interpreter was appointed. It was Professor Ikoma, of the School of Foreign Languages. Mr. Ikoma came to the deten- tion camp and confirmed that the story Sorge typed was actually his.

90929 — 51 2

1146 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICIJARD SORGE SPY CASE

After taking oath, Mr. Ikoma translated it into Japanese. A copy was made. And that copy, Professor Ikoma and I signed. And the translation and the typed story were put into a document.

The criminal bureau of the Ministry of Justice prepared the trans- lation of his story into pamphlet form. Sorge asked me to make my own official document when he was talking about the activities center- ing around the German Embassy. He didn't want to type his own story when that story came.

After his typewritten story was completed and the translation was completed, I asked Professor Ikoma to come and investigate Sorge about that phase of his activities.

The official document of that investigation consists of about 38 volumes. At the end of each volume, Professor Ikoma translated it into German and asked Sorge whether there was any disagreement on it, and after he found it right he affixed his signature on each volume. Then Professor Ikoma and I signed on each volume, and also my secretary affixed his signature on it.

This is the official interrogation document based on law. Of the contents, I told you about a couple points in the morning session.

Therefore, Sorge's story consists of two parts. One is his type- written story and the other js this official interrogation document.

There is another interrogation document which was made by a police officer, Ohashi. It took time for Ohashi to conduct his in- vestigation. My recollection is that Ohashi's interrogation docu- ment was completed around April or May.

Mr. Tavenner. Of what year ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. 1942. My official interrogation document was com- pleted around June 1942.

The content of my official interrogation document contained infor- mation about the process by which Sorge approached the German Embassy. N

I am going to expand about that now. I don't remember exactly the date, but Sorge came to Japan in 1934. At that time Ott was not the Ambassador. I think he was a colonel attached to a regiment in Nagoya.

At that time Sorge began to approach Ott.

Mr. Tavenner. Was not General Ott at that time military attache to Japan?

Mr. Yoshikawa. I don't know about it, but maybe he was an attache.

It was about the period of Von Kretehner that Sorge approached the German Embassy. By his information and judgment he gained the confidence of the staff of the German Embassy.

He gave General Ott political information. He joined the Nazi Party too. Then Ott became the Ambassador. It presented a very good chance for Sorge.

He frequented the Embassy, and though he did not have an official position in the Embassy, he was one of the highest advisers of the Ambassador. He also cooperated in the intelligence activities of the Embassy.

While he was cooperating, he also drew information from them. And, as T told you in the morning, there were many political diplo- matic military personnel coming from Germany to Japan, and Sorge

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1147

got acquainted with those people. They were talking informally on many important matters. Therefore, while in Japan, he could get the information of Germany. Ott consulted with Sorge on very important matters.

So the information Ambassador Ott could receive from the German foreign office and from the .Japanese foreign office went to Sorge. Not only the ( rerman foreign office, but diplomat ic circles in Japan.

Sorge got the military secrets within the German Embassy. There- fore, the more the .Japanese military men approached the German Embassy, the more information Sorge got out of them.

1 heard this story. This is contained in my official interrogation document.

A Soviet General Rushikoff fled from the Soviet into Manchuria. And he was rescued by the Kwantung Army of Japan.

Rushikoff gave the information of the military positions and mili- tary forces of the Far Eastern Red Army and also Mongolia and Siberia.

The Japanese general staff was delighted to have that kind of informal ion.

Rushikoff was the leader of an anti-Stalin bloc in Siberia.

The .Japanese Army was so jubilant about it that they talked about it to Ott. Ott was also glad and reported to Hitler about it. And he sent a staff officer to Japan.

And after the Japanese examined Rushikoff, the staff officer from Germany examined Rushikoff himself. And he made a very minute report. That staff officer showed t hat report to Sorge.

Sorge asked him to leave that document with him for study, and he took a picture of the document and sent the film to Moscow.

Later the so-called Nomonhan incident occurred. The Japanese Army lost several divisions. By the mass artillery and tanks the Japanese lost a heavy casualty.

Mr. Tavkxnkr. The casualty loss was reported at 45,000, was it not I

Mr. Vosiiikawa. I do not remember. It was like putting Japan's hand in a charcoal brazier.

Sorge also said that the anti-Stalin bloc in Siberia was also elim- inated. The second document, which was the official interrogation document, contained that kind of information.

Unfortunately, no copy was made of this document, and I am afraid that the document was lost by fire.

Mr. Tavenner. Do von mean lost as a result of the bombing of Tokyo?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Possibly.

This is the first time that I talk about this, 10 years after the inci- dent. During that period. Ambassador Ott was very pleased with Sorge and offered him a high position in the Embassy. Sorge de- clined.

Because he declined, his reputation increased. However, he told me that if he had become a member of the official staff he would have been investigated about his past in detail, and he was afraid of that. He told me about that.

Thus the official interrogation document was completed.

1148 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

Mr. Tavenner. I hand you four pages in Japanese script and ask you to identify those and state whether or not your name appears in connection with it?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. This is my seal.

Mr. Tavenner. You are also pointing out, in addition to your sig- nature, a seal placed beneath your signature?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

Mr. Tavenner. The seal also appears, half at the top of page 2 and half at the top of page 3, does it not ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

That is the way the Japanese official documents are made. They prove that the documents are official by putting the signature on the continuation pages.

Mr. Tavenner. In other words, that is a method of identification, by placing what you call your "han" on the document?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

Mr. Tavenner. This document which has your signature and "han" attached is an affidavit, I believe, which vou gave on February 19, 1949, is it not?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

Mr. Tavenner. The English translation is attached to your origi- nal Japanese affidavit?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

Mr. Tavenner. I desire to offer the document in evidence and ask that it be marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 1."

Mr. Walter. Let it be marked as an exhibit and received in evi- dence.

(The document above referred to, marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 1," is filed herewith.)

Mr. Tavenner. I would now like to read the English translation of the document, which was translated by Minora Endo, an official translator of Japanese documents in the employ of general headquar- ters, Far East Command.

(Reading:)

Statement by Yoshikawa MrrsrsAo-A, Government Official Building 1, Dojunkai Aoyama Apartments 1. 1 chome, Aoyama Onden, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo-to, February 19, 1949

I affirm that, according to my conscience, I will state the truth, adding nothing and concealing nothing.

I voluntarily declare as follows:

That in October 1941, I was a procurator assigned to the procurator's bureau of the Tokyo district criminal court; that on said date, in my official capacity I was assigned to conduct a procurator's examination on Richard Sors;e who at the time was confined in the Tokyo detention house: that I did conduct that investigation until May 1942: that the investigation by me of Richard Sorge was conducted in the procurator's examination room in the Tokyo detention house; that during the proceedings Richard Sorge voluntarily made an offer to me to prepare and submit a statement on the general outline of his espionage activities; t bat as a result of this offer. Richard Sorge prepared such a statement in the German language in my presence and in the procurator's examination room ; that I be typewriter used by Richard Sorge for the preparation of said statement was bis property which he used in his house before bis arrest and had been confiscated as evidence : that after typing a chapter or a paragraph of said statement, Richard Sorge read the same in my presence and made deletions, additions, and correc- tions in my presence, and banded tbe same to me; that only one original copy of said statement was prepared by Richard Sorge; that because in said statement

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1149

the portion concerning his activities in Shanghai was not sufficient, Richard Sorge personally retyped said portion preparing anew 9aid portion bj supple- menting thai which was Insufficient, and submitted said new portion to me; that I replaced said portion in the original statement ; that the document at i ached hereto, consisting i>r i_'i pages, is thai portion which I deleted from the original document because I pu1 in the original statement thai portion which Richard Sorge later retyped as stated above; that said document is a portion of a state- ment which Richard Sorge first prepared and corrected in my presence in the procurator's examination room within the Tokyo detention house during October and November 1!>41 and handed to me; that said document does not bear the Signature of Richard Sorge, the reason being that said document is no more than a portion of a statement prepared by Richard Sorge and that Richard Sorge affixed his signature at the end when the entire statement was completed and thai he was nol asked particularly to atlix ids signature on said document which

was a portion Of said statement ; that said document has 1 n in my possession

from the afore-mentioned date until February IS, VM'.K on winch date it was turned over by me to Lt. Col. Paul Rusch, G-2, General Headquarters, Far East Command, United States Army, at said officer's request.

YOSHIKAWA MlTSlSAIiA.

i Translatob's Note. — A seal bearing the name "Yoshikawa" appears over the bottom part of the signature. The same seal is also affixed overlapping the first and second pages.)

February 19, 1949.

I certify that I am an official translator of Japanese documents in the employ of General Headquarters. Far East Command, and that to the best of my ability, skill, and judgment, the within and foregoing is a true and accurate translation in the English language in two pages of the photostat of the original document attached hereto consisting of four pages which is the affirmation of Yoshikawa Mitsusada.

Minortj En DO.

Mr. Tavenner. The statement which you gave at that time over your signature and seal was true ; was it not '.

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

Mr. Tavenner. Your statement under oath refers to 24 pages at- tached to your affidavit as being the document which Richard Sorge wrote on his own typewriter in German ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. That is correct.

Mr. Tavenner. I will ask you to examine the 24 pages attached to your affidavit and state whether it is the document written by Sorge on his own typewriter in the German language.

Mr. Yoshikawa. The paper and typewriter impounded were used by Sorge.

Mr. Tavenner. And this is a photostat which he attached to the same document ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. That is right.

Mr. Tavenner. Will you examine the document and state whether or not the corrections" appearing therein were made personally by Richard Sorge in your presence?

Mr. Yoshikawa. That is true.

Mr. Tavenner. I desire to offer this document for identification only at this time, and ask that it be marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 2."

Mr. Walter. Let it be market for identification only.

(The document above referred to was marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 2" for identification only.)

Mr. Tavenner. I hand you now a document written in Japanese consisting of eight pages, and ask }'ou whether or not your signature and seal appear on that document '.

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

1150 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

I dictated this document, but the signature and seal are mine.

Mr. Tavenner. This is a sworn affidavit which you gave over your signature and seal ; is it not ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

Mr. Tavenner. And does it bear date of April 1, 1949?

Mr. Yoshikawa. It does.

Mr. Tavenner. Attached to your affidavit is the English transla- tion ; is that correct ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. I desire to offer this document in evidence, both the Japanese and the English translation, and ask that it be marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 3."

Mr. Walter. For what purpose are they both offered ?

Mr. Tavenner. The main purpose is that it is really one exhibit. One is the translation of the Japanese. It is all one exhibit.

Mr. Walter. It will be marked and received.

(The documents above referred to, marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 3," are filed herewith.)

Mr. Tavenner. I will read the English translation. [Reading:]

Oath

I hereby swear that I will state the truth according to my conscience, adding nothing and concealing nothing. April 1, 1949.

/s/ Yoshikawa Mitsitsada. [seal]

Statement

I, Yoshikawa Mitsusada, having taken the oath prescribed by Japanese law which appears on the attached sheet, do hereby make the following statement.

1. I am presently serving as Chief of the Special Investigation Bureau of the Attorney General's office. During or about 1941 and 1942. I was procurator in the procurator's office of the Tokyo District Criminal Court. I worked on the so-called international intelligence ring case involving Richard Sorge, Ozaki Hozumi et al., myself examining Richard Sorge, Kawai Teikichi, and others. Because of the serious nature of the case, and because of the implication of Ozaki Hozumi, a Japanese [of] comparatively high social position, and aliens like Richard Sorge, Max Klausen, and Branko de Voukelitch, ample consideration had to be given to its international repercussions. My investigations were conducted in strict secrecy, and I was careful not to libel the defendants and others involved. I exercised strict supervision over the judicial police who assisted me in the investigations, personally attending the investigations as a witness on frequent occasions to see that torture and other coercive methods were not employed. Of course, I never resorted to torture or other coercive methods in my own investigations of Richard Sorge and Kawai Teikichi, but assumed throughout as gentlemanly an attitude as possible.

At Sorge's request, I arranged to have the judicial police examinations in his case take place in the morning, and I myself examined him in the after- noon. At his suggestion, I investigated the broad aspects of the case, and I allowed him to type his statement in German before me. Following the com- pletion of the judicial police investigations, I was with Sorge both in the morn- ings and in the afternoons. After he had finished the afore-mentioned state- ment, I examined him with respect to the concrete details of his intelligence activities, and, at his request, compiled the results into an interrogation record in the presence of an interpreter.

During the afore-mentioned investigations, Richard Sorge and Kawai Teikichi described the intelligence activities of Agnes Smedley in China, and Richard Sorge made a statement concerning the intelligence activities of Giienther Stein in Tokyo. No changes were made in the facts stated by Richard Surge and Kawai Teikichi with regard to Smedley and Stein during the course of the investiga- tions by the police ami procurators, the preliminary examinations, and the public trials.

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1151

Daring the investigation, I realized thai Smedley and Stein were key litres in the ring, but I was unable to arresl and indict them because they were not in Japan at the time. Had they been in Japan, I am convinced that, as a procura- tor, I would have arrested and indicted them.

The foregoing is a voluntary statement. I was notified before making it that it would be recorded and thai it might be used as evidence.

April 1, 1949.

/s/ Yosiiikawa .Mil SISAIIA. [SEAL]

The translator's certificate is attached, which I will not read.1

translator's certificate

I. Tadao Yamada, CWO, USA, W2141047, having been duly sworn, state that 1 am an official translator of the Japanese language employed as such by General Headquarters, Far East < Command, since July ]!»47, and that the foregoing English translation of the statement executed by Yosiiikawa Mitsusada, dated April 1, 1!)4!>, is a true and accurate translation to the best of my ability, skill, and judgment.

April 10. 104!>.

/s/ Tadao Yamada, Tadao Yamada, CWO, USA, W21J,10Jtf.

/s/ G. A. Hedley. G. A. Hedley, Captain (sic). Infantry Summary Court.

That is a true and correct statement; is it?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

Mr. Tavexxer. I now hand you a certificate over your signature and seal bearing date March 4, 1049, and I will ask you to identify that document and your signature and your seal.

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

Mr. Tavexxer. And to it is attached the English translation of the certificate, appearing over your signature and seal?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

Mr. Tavexxer. I desire to offer the certificate, accompanied by the English translation, in evidence, and ask that it be marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit Xo. 4."

Mr. Walter. It will be so marked and received.

(The documents above referred to, marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 4," are filed herewith.)

Mr. Tavenner. I believe your seal also appears under your signa- ture on the English translation ; does it not \

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

Mr. Tavexxer. I desire to read this certificate. [Reading: ]

General Headquarters. Far East Command,

Military Intelligence Section, General Staff.

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the two booklets listed below are printed reproductions prepared by the Criminal Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Justice of accurate Japanese translations made by Translator Ikoma Yoshitoshi of original Ger- man notes written by Richard Sorge, whom I examined in my capacity as a pro- curator of the Tokyo District Criminal Court, and incorporated together with the original notes into the official case records: and that the contents of the booklets are identical with the contents of the said translation.

1. "Sorge case materials (2)" (pt. 1 of translated notes of Richard Sorge), February 1942, Criminal Affairs Bureau. .Ministry of Justice.

1 Printed for the record, but not read.

1152 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

2. "Sorge case materials (3)" (pt. 2 of translated notes of Richard Sorge), April 1942, Criminal Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Justice. March 4, 1949.

I shall not read the translator's certificate.1

/S/ TOSHIKAWA MlTSUSADA. [SEAL]

Chief, Special Examination Bureau, General Headquarters,

translator's certificate

I hereby certify that I am an official translator of Japanese documents in the employ of General Headquarters, Far East Command, and that to the best of my ability, skill, and judgment, the above is a true and accurate translation in the English language of the attached document.

/s/ Tadao Yamata, Tadao Yam ada, CWO USA W2141047.

This certificate refers to two volumes [indicating another docu- ment]. I hand you a document in Japanese marked "Consecutive Exhibit No. 17," enclosure No. 2, and I will ask you if that bears the identification information of the first document which I read to you from your certificate?

Mr. Yoshikawa. The original, which was sent to the court, did not have the table of contents and index. The table of contents and index were made by the Criminal Affairs Bureau. The rest is an exact document.

Mr. Tavenner. I desire to offer that document in Japanese listed as the first document in Yoshikawa Exhibit 4 for identification only, and ask that it be marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit 5."

Mr. Walter. Let it be so identified.

(The document above referred to was marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 5" for identification only.)

Mr. Tavenner. I hand you now another volume identified as con- secutive exhibit 20-B, enclosure 2, which bears on the front certain de- scriptive data, and ask whether that is the same descriptive data as the second item in Yoshikawa exhibit No. 4 ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

Mr. Tavenner. It is the same document to which you referred in your certificate ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Except that the table of contents and index were not in the original.

Mr. Tavenner. I desire to offer this document for identification only, and ask that it be marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 6."

Mr. Walter. Let it be so identified.

(The document above referred to was marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 6" for identification only.)

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Yoshikawa, did you prepare and furnish the material which went into the composition of those two documents?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes, I did; and Mr. Ikoma translated it.

Mr. Tavenner. I want to ask you a very few questions relating to some of the individuals mentioned in the course of these reports.

You have previously referred to Miyagi. Do you know whether Miyagi was an American citizen ? I believe I asked you that question before.

Mr. Yoshikawa. I don't have an exact recollection. However,

1 Printed for the record, but not read.

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1153

Miyagi intended to go back after his mission was completed in Japan, therefore I thought that he was an American citizen.

Mr. Tavenner. You mean hack to the United States?

Mr. Yoshikawa. He said before his death that he wanted to go hack" to America.

Mr. Tavenner. Did your investigation disclose the circumstances under which Miyagi first came to Japan?

Mr. Yosiiikawa. I didn't personally and directly investigate Miyagi. I only saw him several times.

Procurator Yoshioka was in charge of the investigation of Miyagi.

Also, a policeman investigated him.

I received their reports and gave them direction.

I don't have a clear recollection since it was an incident of 10 years ago.

I recall that Miyagi belonged to the Japanese section of the Ameri- can Communist Party.

I recall that Miyagi stated that he received an order from the higher echelon of his organization to engage in the world revolution in Japan.

Mr. Tavenner. World revolution?

Mr. Yosiiikawa. To do some important activities in Japan for the sake of the world revolution.

Miyagi told me that he belonged directly to the Comintern doing espionage activities.

That is what he thought.

I do not have an exact recollection about how he came to Japan.

But I recall the names Yano and Roy who are involved in sending Miyagi to Japan.

I do not recall where Miyagi met those people, whether in New York or in Los Angeles.

I recall also that Miyagi mentioned in addition to those people he met an American Jewish person, but I don't have a clear recollection on that.

He went to Japan with instructions to meet a person who put up a newspaper ad saying "Ukiyo-e print wanted."

Mr. Tavenner. Stating what?

Mr. Yoshikawa. "Ukiyo-e print wanted."

According to Sorge's statement, he also had instructions to watch for the newspaper ad "Ukiyo-e print wanted," and he found that and found the person in Ueno.

Mr. Tavenner. Ueno is a park in Tokyo?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

That is what I vaguely remember.

Mr. Tavenner. In the course of the documents referred to there ap- pears the name "Jacob." Did your investigation disclose who Jacob was or whether or not it was a name thai was used as a code name?

Mr. Yoshikawa. I asked Sorge about it. but Sorge said, "I know him as Jacob," but he didn't say whether he knew him or not.

Mr. Tavenner. Did your investigation disclose whether or not he was an American citizen?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Sorge said that he was an American news- paperman.

Mr. Tavenner. Stationed where?

Mr. Yoshikawa. In Shanghai.

1154 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

When Sorge went to Shanghai from Moscow, he met Smedley, and with the help of Smedley he got the cooperation of three Caucasians, three foreigners.

When I heard Sorge saying that, I asked him who they were. Sorge said he got the cooperation of three foreigners and not more. He got the cooperation of the Japanese and Chinese and only three foreigners. When I asked who they were, Sorge told me Jacob was one of them.

Sorge didn't give any information about Jacob any further, and so I asked him what kind of cooperation he got from those people.

He wrote by typewriter, "These kinds of information."

I couldn't get any information out of him any further.

Mr. Tavenner. Was any statement made as to what newspaper or newspapers the man identified as Jacob was a representative of or correspondent for ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. He didn't say.

Mr. Tavenner. You spoke of three Caucasians, but you have told us just of the individual by the name of Jacob. Who were the other two?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Another person, he didn't disclose his name, but he was an American. He was a young person. He was on the staff of the American consulate.

Mr. Tavenner. He was a member of the staff of the American consulate ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

Mr. Tavenner. Located where?

Mr. Yoshikawa. In Shanghai.

Mr. Tavenner. Was any further description obtained of the in- dividual on the staff of the American consulate?

Mr. Yoshikawa. He didn't say anything about him, so I asked him what kind of information he got out of him.

(Kepresenative Clyde Doyle left the hearing room.)

Mr. Yoshikawa. He told me that the person was quite brilliant and was giving him information concerning the American foreign policy toward China and the Nanking government.

Mr. Walter. Did he give the name ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. No. He laughed and did not disclose his name.

Mr. Potter. What was the date ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. I don't remember exactly, but it was around 1931 and 1932 when Sorge organized the so-called Shanghai group.

Mr. Potter. How long did this group work for Sorge ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. It was for about 2 years.

And Sorge's successor was receiving information from that group.

Mr. Potter. From that same group ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

Mr. Walter. This information from the American consular office in Shanghai was given to Sorge in 1931 and 1932; is that correct?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

Mr. Tavenner. You have given us information relating to two of these Caucasians whose assistance was given to Sorge. Who was the third one?

Mr. Yoshikawa. He said that it was a German woman.

Mr. Tavenner. Can you give us further information regarding her?

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1155

Mr. Yosiiikawa. I didn't get any information about her of her than expressed in bis own story.

Mr. T.w TENNER. The name "Paul" and the name "John" appear in the course of Sorge's con fession. Did your invest igation disclose any further identification off hose two persons?

Mr. Yosiiikawa. The information I got concerning Paul appeared in Sorge's story, but when I instructed Procurator [wo to investigate Sorge, he got further information about Paul; but, since I do not have the documents, I do not have a clear recollection.

While Sorge was working in Shanghai, Ozaki was recalled by a newspaper. Asalii.

Ozaki recommended his successor to Sorge, a Japanese man.

This Japanese was cooperating with Paul after Sorge left Shang- hai.

This Japanese man was Funakoshi.

Mr. Tavenner. You spoke of the giving of information, after Sorge left Shanghai, to Sorge's successor. Who was Sorge's successor?

Mr. Yosiiikawa. Paul.

Mr. Tavenner. The same person called Paul '.

Mr. Yoshtkawa. Paul was Sorge's successor.

Mr. Tavenner. Can you furnish the committee with any identify- ing information as to the nationality, or any other information re- garding Paul '.

Mr. Yosiiikawa. I do not know about the nationality of Paul, but he belonged to the fourth section of the Red army, and his rank was major general.

Mi'. Walter. Was he a German, do you know?

Mr. Yosiiikawa. I am sorry, but I haven't conducted a full investi- gation about Paul.

Mr. Tavexner. You spoke about the third Caucasian furnishing information to Sorge as being a German woman. Did your investiga- tion disclose any connection on the part of a woman by the name of Regattenhein with the Sorge principals; that is, the principals in the Sorge ring '

Mr. Yoshtkawa. When Regattenhein appeared in Japan, she was in the Japanese group and not the Chinese group.

Mr. Tavenner. In other words, this person by the name of Regat- tenhein had no connection with the Chinese phase of the Sorge spy ring?

Mr. Yosiiikawa. I don't have any information about that. I didn't make any investigation of it.

Mr. Tavenner. I assume from what the witness has said that Sorge knew of her presence in Japan \

Mr. Kuroda. Regattenhein.'

Mr. Tavenner. Yes.

Mr. Yosiiikawa. Sorge said so.

Sorge said that Regattenhein is the girl friend of Guenther Stein.

She was very cooperative with Guenther Stein, and she went to Shanghai as a messenger of the group.

She gathered information also.

Mr. Tavenner. Was she arrested in Japan in connection with your spy investigation?

Mr. Yoshikawa. No. She wasn't in Japan when the arrests came. She left with Guenther Stein.

1156 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

Mr. Tavenner. Do you have any information as to what country she traveled to when she left Japan ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. I don't have any information about that. Since she disappeared, we lost interest in her. We heard Guenther Stein was going to Hong Kong, but really we didn't have any information about her.

Mr. Tavenner. There is an incident related in the course of the confession by Richard Sorge regarding his traveling through the United States on his way to Tokyo.

It refers to the fact that while in New York an arrangement was made for him to go to Chicago, where he was instructed to meet a certain employee of the Washington Post at the Chicago world fair. Did you endeavor to ascertain the name of the individual whom Sorge was supposed to meet in Chicago ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. I instructed Policeman Ohashi to get that inform- ation, and I recall that Ohashi gave me his report, and I tried to con- fer with Sorge about it when I talked to him. I also instructed Ohashi to find out who that person was. I also asked directly to- Sorge who that person was, but Sorge did not disclose his name.

(Representative Clyde Doyle returned to hearing room.)

Mr. Walter. In discussing his trip through the United States, did Sorge give you the names of any Americans who escorted him or with whom he came in contact?

Mr. Yoshikawa. He didn't disclose the names.

Before he formed a Chinese group and Japanese group, Sorge was vice chief of the information bureau of the Comintern.

Mr. Walter. Did your investigation reveal any information with regard to an American named Willie Lehman?

Mr. Yoshikawa. He was chief of the Lehman group in China.

Mr. Tavenner. What do you mean by the Lehman group in China?

Mr. Yoshikawa. I don't have an exact recollection about it, but it was either a group belonging to the fourth section of the Red army or belonging to the Comintern.

Mr. Tavenner. By that do you mean a separate group from the Sorge group ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. That is right.

I recall that Sorge told me that Sorge and Lehman were personally acquainted.

Mr. Tavenner. What part of China was the seat of the activities of the Lehman group?

Mr. Yoshikawa. In Shanghai ; so I remember.

I don't have an exact recollection.

Mr. Tavenner. Do you have any recollection of the names of any American citizens who were connected with the Lehman group in ad- dition to Lehman himself?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Concerning a group in which Americans had any connection, I recall the Harbin group in Manchuria.

This group existed as a mail box for Sorge while he was working in China, and this group belonged to the fourth section of the Red army.

Klansen was transferred to the Harbin group by order of the fourth sect ion of the Red army.

I recall that Sorge himself also went to Harbin.

The radio transmitter was established in the American consulate in Harbin.

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1157

Mr. Tavenner. Do you mean the radio station that was used in the transmission of messages to Moscow?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

Mr. Tavenner. Were those messages transmitted in code?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Smv: I think so.

Mr. Tavenner. When did thai occur?

Mr. Yoshikawa. About L931 or L932 Sorge was using hi- Harbin group as a mail box.

Mr. Tavenner. If a radio station in the Ajnerican consulate in Harbin in Manchuria was being used t<> t ransmit messages to Moscow, who was it in the American consulate who permitted that use or him- self engaged in the use of t tie radio for t hat purpose \

Mr. VcsniK.wvA. I don't remember the name.

1 instructed Procurator I wo. who was in charge of Klausen, to in- vest igate t hat.

I recall that Mr. [wo reported to me about the name of that Amer- ican, hut I don't recall exactly his name.

Mr. Tavenner. Was there more than one American connected with the Harbin group of the fourth section of the Red army, as far as your investigation disclosed?

Mr. Vosiiikawa. 1 don't have any recollection, so I cannot say.

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know whether the confession of Max Klausen will throw light on the identification of the American in Harbin who cooperated with the fourth section of the Red army \

Mr. Vosiiikawa. I think so.

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Yoshikawa. you were engaged for a long period of time in the investigation of international communism in connec- tion with the Sorge case.

Mr. Vosiiikawa. Yes.

Mr. Tavenner. Have you any observations or suggestions that you would care to make to this committee, which is a committee of the Congress of the United States, with regard to investigations of inter- national communism '.

Mr. Yoshikawa. The Sorge case revealed that the investigation of international Communist activities cannot be conducted successfully alone by any one country.

The ivw nat ions of the world should cooperate in helping each other to conduct the invest igat ion.

Information should be exchanged.

National sectionalism is very harmful.

We have to keep secrets. However, we need cooperation; so I think.

My desire is t hat from now on, in the future, we would like to have cooperation and assistance from America.

The second point is : I have found that the spy network of Moscow covers all over the world.

On this point we would like to have American cooperation and assistance.

Mr. Tavenner. Thank you very much.

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Walter. Mr. Yoshikawa, I trust that your visit here to the United States has been a pleasant one and a profitable one.

Mr. Yoshikawa. Thank you.

1158 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

Mr. Walter. And I do feel that there should be cooperation between the Government of the United States and other governments of the world so that we may exchange information that will aid all of the free peoples of the world to understand what this conspiracy means.

Mr. Yoshikawa. Thank you.

Mr. Walter. And I express the hope that your visit here has provided some sort of basis for the cooperation you have spoken of.

Mr. Yoshikawa. Thank you.

Mr. Walter. And I assure you that we appreciate very much your cooperation with this committee.

Mr. Yoshikawa. As a person working in the Japanese Government, I would also like to express my appreciation to your committee.

Mr. Walter. Mr. Doyle.

Mr. Doyle. I wish to thank the gentleman also. It is very encourag- ing. May I ask one question :

You stated that Sorge had confessed before you expected him to. Why did he do it so early ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. I was expecting that it would take a longer time, and if it had taken a longer time I thought I would be pushed in a difficult position because of pressure from the German Embassy as well as from the Japanese Army.

His collaborators were all rounded up, and also the evidences came up ; so he realized that he had no chance.

Before he confessed we had this conversation :

I talked to Sorge and said to him that Klausen belonged to the Fourth Section of the Red Army. Voukelitch was of the Comintern. Ozaki and Miyagi were also members of the Comintern. And their statements were in discrepancy, and so I told Sorge, "I will explain to you about this question."

We were talking about this, and then he began to confess.

Mr. Doyi:e. Thank you. May I ask this question : About 3 weeks ago four gentlemen from Japan visited this committee. You were one of them. May I ask, when you go back home do you think of having a committee such as this in your own legislative body, or are you going to recommend something like this committee?

Mr. Yoshikawa. About the establishing of a committee similar to this, we are going to study that very carefully, but for us the most important thing is that the people of Japan realize the menace of international communism.

Mr. Doyle. Thank you very much.

Mr. Walter. Mr. Potter.

Mr. Potter. Mr. Yoshikawa, 1, too, wish to thank you for your splendid testimony.

Mr. Yoshikawa. Thank you.

Mi-. Potter. Your telling us the story of your efforts in the Sorge case has been a dramatic example of how international communism works; so we are most grateful to you for giving us the benefit of your knowledge.

Mr. Yoshikawa. Thank you.

Mr. Potter. 1 would like to ask one question.

I noted your statement that the Japanese people are aware of the conspiracy as contained in international communism. Do you feel that due to the awareness of the Japanese people the Government <>f

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1159

Japan lias taken all adequate precautions t«» expose and eliminate the conspiracy from the country?

Mr. Ktjroda. My translation was: I understood him to say the important thing was to make the Japanese people realize more fully about the menace of international coniinunisin.

Mr. Potter. Do you feel the Japanese people do realize the menace of international communism?

Mr. Yosiiik.wva. And also they are afraid of it.

Mr. Potter. Do you have any Communist members in your Japa< nese Diet \

Mr. Yosiiik.wva. Yes.

Mr. Potter. How many, in proportion of the total membership of the Diet?

Mr. Yosiiikawa. Twenty-five in both Houses.

There are about 25 Communists in both Houses, but this number is after the puree by the SCAP | Supreme Commander of Allied Powers]. Before the purge there were more Communist members.

Mr. Potter. Do you feel that the Communist members in your Diet will decrease rather than increase in the future?

Mr. Yosiiikawa. The number will decrease.

In Japan, members of the Communist Party, like members of other parties, have to register.

As of June last year, the members of the Communist Party regis- tered were 1 1 0,001 >.'

But the number decreased and now it is estimated at about (50,000.

In my estimation there are about 20,000 unregistered Communists in addition to those.

About 250,000 sympathizers are in Japan. They are not members, but are sympathizers.

Mr. Potter. Do you have any trade-unions that are dominated by Communists ?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. There are trade-unions which are under the influence of the Communist Party.

Mr. Potter. In what fields?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Metal and various industrial fields.

Also, the Communist Party has operatives operating secretly within the democratic organizations.

Once the Communist Party captured 2,500,000 votes, but now their following is dwindling.

The Communist Party membership is decreasing now.

Mr. Potter. That is to the credit of the people of Japan, after a war when the Communists used that war to gain their end. That is a credit to the wisdom of thepeople of Japan.

Mr. Yoshikawa. Thank you, but the Communists are waiting for the next revolutionary wave.

Mr. PoTrER. Both in Japan and in the United States,

Mr. Walter. Anything further, Mr. Tavenner?

Mr. Tavenner. No, sir.

Mr. Walter. The committee will stand adjourned.

( Thereupon, at 4 : 25 p. m., an adjournment was taken.)

HEAKINGS ON AMERICAN ASPECTS OF THE RICHAKD SORGE SPY CASE

(Based on Testimony of Mitsnsada Yoshikawa and Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby)

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1951

United States House of Representatives,

Committee on Un-American Activities,

Washington, D. 0.

PUBLIC HEARING

The Committee on Un-American Activities met pursuant to call at 10 : 45 a. m., in room 226, Old House Office Building, Hon. John S. Wood (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present : Representatives John S. Wood (chair- man), Francis E. Walter, James B. Frazier, Jr., and Harold H. Velde.

Staff members present : Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel ; Thomas W. Beale, Si\, assistant counsel; Louis J. Russell, senior investigator; Courtney E. Owens, investigator; Raphael I. Nixon, director of re- search ; John W. Carrington, clerk ; and A. S. Poore, editor.

Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order, please.

Whom do you have ?

Mr. Tavenner. Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby.

Mr. Wood. General Willoughby, will you stand and be sworn, please ? Do you solemnly swear the evidence you give this committee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ?

General Willoughby. I do.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. CHARLES ANDREW WILLOUGHBY

Mr. Tavenner. Will you please state your name ?

General Willoughby. Charles Andrew Willoughby.

Mr. Tavenner. What is your present position ?

General Willoughby. Major general, United States Army, awaiting retirement for partial disability and length of service as a veteran of several wars, namely, World War I, 1917; World War II, 1941; the North Korean war, 1950; and the Chinese Communist war, 1951.

Mr. Tavenner. Where did you last serve and in what capacity ?

General Willoughby. I served as Mac Arthur's chief of intelligence since 1939 throughout the campaigns of the Southwest Pacific and the occupation of Japan, and in the same capacity throughout the Korean conflict.

90929—51 3 1161

1162 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

Mr. Tavenner. I understand you desire to make a general state- ment as the basis for your testimony in this hearing ?

General Willoughby. With the permission of the chairman, I would request the privilege of stating my position throughout this entire hearing as follows :

Recent newspaper reports have developed a tendency to attribute sensational qualities to my impending testimony before certain con- gressional committees, under normal subpena. I am described as "threatening a brand-new ruckus," as being "sore at the Pentagon," as "vowing to jar the Capital with spy tales." Yet, another enfant terrible of the press charges me with "promises to redden faces and to set off explosions," and as being "a thorn in the side of the Penta- gon." These are pure journalistic exaggerations.

I have no direct issue with the Army or the State Department. The Army is sound. It was put to a most cruel test in Korea, and it has passed summa cum laude, as on many other historical occasions. After 41 years' service, since 1910, 1 leave the Army with a feeling of regret. The Regular service is a hard taskmaster, but it is also a delightful fraternal organization.

As regards the State Department, I have served as military attache for many years in our embassies of Caracas, Bogata, and Quito, in the period 1920-30. The field personnel is first class. The American diplomatic posts abroad are maintained with the dignity commen- surate with a great nation. They operate in an atmosphere of sharp competition, since foreign establishments are maintained on a more or less lavish scale. Tokyo is a most conspicuous example.

The real subject matter of my presentation to Congress is in a field of international danger, in which all political parties could meet amicably, on grounds of common interest. Consequently, my proposed statements are completely devoid of any political motivation or purpose.

There are recognizable historical factors, the dangerous impact of which is only now beginning to be felt. The dead hand of the past rests heavily on a precarious present. We are still in the shadow of Cairo, Yalta, Tehran, and Potsdam. Retribution has been swift and terrible. The victors of 1915 have created a Frankenstein that may yet slay them : the Red menace of international communism. It is only fair, however, to accept that the present administration is staggering under an intolerable burden which it inherited from its predecessors and did not itself create.

It fell within the purview of MacArthur's Intelligence Section to confront this menace in the Far East, and to unmask the grimacing face of the Red Medusa.

The story of Richard Sorge, Soviet master spy, became the vehicle of presentation. It has been covered initially by Drew Pearson, then by Walter Simmons and Alfred Kohlberg, and more recently, in its main features, by Newsweek and United States News & World Re- port. However, their stories merely scratched the surface. For a period of years, Tokyo has filed with the War Department a most extensive documentation on Sorge, contained in a number of consecu- tive exhibits, aggregating over a million words, with hundreds of plates, photostats, and illustrations.

While certain individuals emerge sharply in this report, they must be viewed against the sinister background of a world conspiracy, the

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1163

essential framework of which should be known to our legislators and to our people. In its unimpeachable and devastating evidence, this case should dispel carefully nurtured false notions on the responsibili- ties for the China debacle and place this controversial subject into proper focus. The real cause for the communization of China is the long-range subversive operation, over the last two decades, conducted by professional Communists under orders of the Kremlin-controlled Third Comintern.

The element which intrigued Mac Arthur's Intelligence was the immediate recognition that Richard Sorge's story did not begin or end with Tokyo, but was only a chip in the general mosaic of Soviet strategy.

An investigation was opened into the Shanghai period and the Third Comintern "apparatus." In Shanghai, in the early 1930's, we are not dealing with the period of uneasy alliance with the Soviet, 1941-45, but with the more significant prewar years of 1929-39, in the heydey of the Third Communist International, prelude to the infamous Stalin-Hitler Pact, sole factor that made World War II at all possible.

We are dealing here with a conspiratorial epoch in the history of modern China. Shanghai was the vineyard of communism. Here were sown the dragons' teeth that have ripened into the Red harvest of today — and the spadework was done by men and women of many nationalities who had no conceivable personal stake in China other than an inexplicable fanaticism for an alien cause, the Communist "jehad"' of Pan-Slavism for the subjugation of the western world.

Most of the old wheelhorses of the American Communist Party appear to have been operating in Shanghai, in one period or another, the professionals of the clandestine fraternity, as well as mere acolytes and dupes, flirting moth-like with the Red menace; such as Earl Browder, Sam Darcy, Eugene Dennis, Harry Berger, Gerhart E'isler, and many others.

My cumulative reports contain over 180 identities, surnames, aliases, and code designations, derived from court records authenticated by American lawyers, or from the fabulous dossiers of the French and British sections of the Shanghai international police. In protection of innocent people, a sharp distinction has been made by us between the "operators" and the "bystanders" — the "joiners" who did not quite appreciate the character of the organizations they helped support.

The exact degree of relationship or association ranges from direct espionage by Comintern "agents" to the twilight zone of fellow- traveling dupes and befuddled liberals — apparently unaware that they have drifted into an^ international conspiracy for the sole benefit of an alien and hostile Government. While this case applies pri- marily to Japan and China, it represents a recognizable pattern that is working in the United States today.

I have filed detailed evidence with appropriate Federal agencies and certain congressional committees. They are now in a position to follow up these leads. I am not a prosecutor. I am only a police- man and investigator. It is thus that I discharge a moral obligation toward the United States, which has received me as an immigrant boy and given me shelter and citizenship as a man.

I have no doubt that the hue and cry will start again, as it did in 1949. I expect to be attacked by the Communist press, from the China Digest in Hong Kong to the Far East Spotlight in New York City.

1164 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

Orders will go out from the shabby loft building on 35 East Twelfth Street, New York. The Red cells will disgorge their indefatigable little workers. The pinko columnists will sharpen their quills. The smear brigade will swing into action. Some Red mouthpiece will prostitute the law of the land and sue me for libel, as before, and I will accept, as before. Yet, in the cacophony of frenzied accusations, I am reminded of an ancient saying :

It is better to fail in a cause that must ultimately succeed, than to succeed in a cause that will ultimately fail.

This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Wood. Any questions, Mr. Counsel ?

Mr. Tavenner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Wood. Proceed.

Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, stating as you do that the Richard Sorge story was only a chip in the general mosaic of Soviet strategy, is it not your opinion that a full disclosure at this time of the ramifications of that story would be useful to the Congress and the people of this country in understanding the background and mean- ing of incidents which Jiave occurred in this country and which likely may recur ?

General Willoughby. I am in entire agreement with Mr. Counsel's opinion. There is no doubt that a disclosure or the development or tracing of links that exist between an international spy master and the present is of immediate practical value, and this committee is peculiarly appropriate to receive this testimony. Ten thousand miles away, while on duty in Tokyo over many years, I have followed with admiration the investigative work of this committee. Their record is unimpeachable, and I consider it a privilege to appear before you.

In this connection, I might pause to pay tribute to a similar com- mittee which has taken its techniques and inspiration from the House committee, namely, the California State Legislature's Senate Com- mittee on Un-American Activities, under the able Senator Jack Tenney.

Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, the problem of putting before the Congress and the people of this country the Sorge story so that they may see and understand similar incidents which have occurred, or incidents of somewhat like character, in this country, and so that they may be on guard as to the recurrence of such things, is one of the purposes of the committee in conducting this hearing.

I should also add that it is the immediate purpose of this com- mittee, in looking into the Sorge case, to ascertain the nature and ex- tent of participation in that great conspiracy of persons of United States citizenship, and what place, if any, those persons have in the Communist conspiracy in the United States as it exists today.

Those are the two major purposes of our hearing.

General Willoughby. I shall attempt to comply with your out- line, Mr. Counsel. In the course of this presentation we will establish the link between Sorge, on the one hand, and the Shanghai operations, perhaps much more important, on the other hand.

We will also develop the similarity of techniques in penetration of political and social fraternal organizations, so-called fronts.

As stated in general outline in my introductory statement, these relationships will be developed. In other words, we are not treating

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1165

the Sorge report as a historical incident or as a repetition of some- thing that lias already been told. I will show you that in Sorge's fragmentary reports there are enough descriptive data of certain organizations in Shanghai which are of paramount interest now be- cause American citizens, especially members of the American Com- munist Party, were active then. Had we known this, I am sure that in the last few years we would have been less tolerant, less patient, with these people.

Therefore, the purpose, as I see it, of your inquiry, is exactly as you have stated, to link the pasl \\ it h the present, and I feel confident that the consecutive questions and answers that will be presented here will accomplish this purpose before a committee which, as I have said, is especially qualified and peculiarly appropriate for this type of inquir}'.

Mr. Vfxde. May I ask a question at this point, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. Wood. Mr. Velde.

Mr. Velde. General, there is a lot of sentiment in this country, and a lot of people have said, that this is merely water over the dam, some- thing that has happened in the past, and the ramifications are no longer important to the American people at this time. What is your idea on that issue ?

General Willoughby. May I refer to my introductory remarks, which were designed as an outline or program of what the committee — and I consider myself a collaborative agent of this committee — hoped to accomplish.

I have said that "The element which intrigued MacArthur's Intelli- gence was the immediate recognition that Richard Sorge's story did not begin or end with Tokyo, but was only a chip in the general mosaic of Soviet strategy." You will obtain a glimpse of Soviet international intrigue, the work of the Third Communist International, which is a tool of the foreign policy of the Kremlin. That will become crystal clear in the course of this presentation.

Likewise, you will find the activities of American Communists. The well-known Gerhart Eisler, who embarrassed the Justice Depart- ment through his escape, is present in Shanghai. He did the same thing then that he pulled on the Batory. There is your link with yes- terday. Earl Browder and Eugene Dennis, the chief of the American Communist Party, appear in the Sorge Shanghai channel. So there is you connection. Your connection is a case history which presents certain operational details that were applied 15 years later, or 10 years later, by well-known Communist operators in the United States. Or, as I stated in my opening remarks, again —

Most of the old wheelhorses of the American Communist Party appear to have been operating in Shanghai, in one period or another, the professionals of the clandestine fraternity, as well as mere acolytes and dupes, flirting moth-like with the Red menace ; such as Earl Browder, Sam Darcy, Eugene Dennis, Harry Berger, Gerhart Eisler, and many others.

Mr. Velde. In other words, General, to simplify it a little bit, you feel that we have to study the manipulations of the Communist Party and the international Comintern over the past quarter century in order to get a clear picture of what their present manipulations might be?

General Willoughby. I feel that strongly, and I agree entirely with your view on that particular subject.

1166 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

Mr. Walter. You feel that the same forces at work then are still at work, toward the same objective?

General Willoughby. Indeed, I do.

Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, during your tenure in Tokyo, did you have occasion to further investigate the Richard Sorge spy rings which were operated in China and Japan ?

General Willoughby. Yes. A perusal of the Sorge reports, frag- mentary or incomplete, indicated, nevertheless, and very plainly so, that his activities in Tokyo were connected with China, Manchuria, and the Siberian mainland.

Mr. Tavenner. After looking into the Sorge case, were you led, as a result of this inquiry, to other localities ?

General Willoughby. Yes. I became interested in Shanghai as a focal point of international intrigue and espionage, and specific data in the Sorge papers that the Soviet Third International, known as the Communist Third International, to be referred to hereafter as the Comintern, was operating in that city.

Mr. Tavenner. Did you subsequently determine that there was available in Shanghai information regarding the activities of Com- munist agents and sympathizers in Shanghai ?

General Willoughby. Yes. I learned that the international police in Shanghai, especially the British and French political sections in the thirties, had developed a considerable volume of information regard- ing subversive activities of Americans and foreign nationals. In some instances these activities were connected with personnel of the American Communist Party.

Mr. Tavenner. As one result of these investigations conducted by you, was there compiled by your command a group of 34 consecutive exhibits containing the records and results of the Japanese arrest, interrogation, and prosecution of Richard Sorge and other defend- ants ?

General Willoughby. Yes.

Mr. Tavenner. Are there also included in these exhibits subsequent interrogations and legal opinions compiled by your command after the occupation of Japan ?

General Willoughby. There are. May I give you a brief defini- tion of this material ? We use the phraseology "exhibit" as a matter of convenience. Actually, they are authenticated, notarized court translations, notarized by a battery of reputable American lawyers.

As this material is voluminous, aggregating hundreds of type- written pages, I felt it my duty to assist this committee or any other investigative body, to prepare personally a brief, rarely exceeding two to three pages. These briefs to these exhibits are referred to as G-2 comment, number so and so. They are in your possession.

This is roughly a description of the material and the dispatch of these exhibits, if that meets your requirements, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, I think I should state for the record that certified copies of the exhibits referred to by the witness were delivered by the Department of the Army to the staff of this com- mittee at various times, the first delivery being made in March 1949 and the last delivery being made on the 15th day of February 1951.

I am advised that at substantially the same times, copies of the same exhibits were delivered to the FBI, CIO, and the State Depart- ment.

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1167

As a part of the investigation, the committee, on December 9, 1949, through one of its investigators, endeavored to obtain information as to the availability of Agnes Smedley, whose name appears throughout these reports, for the purpose of serving a subpena upon her, and ascertained that Agnes Smedley left the United States for Great Britain on December li, which was just 7 days prior to the making of that effort.

Now, the exhibits to which you and I have referred, General Wil- loughby, appear on the table next to you. I will ask you to examine them and state whether or not they are the exhibits which were prepared by your command and under your direct ion and supervision \

General Wh-lottghby. 1 have examined these exhibits, Mr. Counsel, and identify them as being either originals or copies of the consecu- tive reports filed by us in Washington.

May 1 add a remark, sir? Your statement that you received these exhibits through the assistance of the War Department, I would heartily concur in, and say that the Intelligence Section, Department of the Army, under Major General Boiling, have been and are most cooperative in this entire enterprise.

What you said about Smedley and your attempt to summon her, before this committee is news to me, and indicates that you had been aware of the implication of this case for a long time.

Mr. Tavenner. Each of the exhibits is numbered. I believe you have them numbered consecutively, from 1 to 34?

General Willoughby. I believe so. To refresh my memory — [after examining documents] yes, sir.

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer these exhibits, not in evidence, but merely present them to the committee at this time and ask that they be marked for identification only in the same manner and in accordance with the same numbers that they now have, for the sake of clarity and future reference to them. In other words, they would be numbered "Willoughby Exhibits 1 to 34, inclusive."

Mr. Wood. There is no objection on the part of any member of the committee, and they will be so marked.

(The consecutive reports above referred to were marked "Wil- loughby Exhibits Nos. 1 to 34, inclusive," for identification only.)

Mr. Tavenner. As a further result of your investigation of the Sorge case, which led to your travels to Shanghai, were there com- piled by your command certain documents relating to Communist activities of numerous individuals in Shanghai ?

General Willoughby. Yes, sir. May I amplify this, please?

Mr. Tavenner. Yes.

General Willoughby. I was able to track down and obtain a sub- stantial portion — though not the complete file, a substantial portion — of the Shanghai municipal police files, with the assistance of British, French, and Chinese officials and the Central Intelligence Agency, with whom I had been on efficient and friendliest collaboration for a number of years.

Mr. Tavenner. As a result of your efforts, you did obtain all of the files which were left intact?

General Willoughby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Tavenner. I refer you now, or show you, point out to you, two metal lockers. I would like for you to examine the lockers and their

1168 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

contents and state whether or not they are the Shanghai police files to which you refer ?

General Willottghby (after examining lockers and contents). Mr. Counsel, they are. In consideration of the extensive labor of this committee, and realizing that your research staff was probably limited, I have attempted to organize these files in the technique of a reference library in which the contents are systematically numbered, and alpha- betical card indexes and cross-references have been prepared.

Mr. Tavenner. I notice in the top of the trunk two typewritten lists. What are they?

General Willottghby. These are entitled "Indexes to Contents." They identify the contents both by title and reference number.

Mr. Tavenner. These trunks were shipped to me, Frank S. Taven- ner, as chief counsel of the Committee on Un-American Activities on May 7, 1951, from Tokyo, were they not?

General Willottghby. I concur.

Mr. Tavenner. I desire to present to the committee the two trunks with their contents, and ask that they be marked '"Willoughby Exhib- its 35 and 36" for identification only.

Mr. Wood. So ordered.

(The two metal trunks above referred to, together with their con- tents, were marked "Willoughby Exhibits 35 and 36," respectively, for identification only.)

Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, you will recall that this com- mittee first contacted you relative to the subject of this inquiry in 1949. Subsequently, we requested you to prepare at your conven- ience a concise report on the Sorge case, embodying the essential parts of that case, particularly those of interest to the United States, in order that this matter might be presented more completely at a public hearing. Is that correct ?

General Willoughby. That is correct.

Mr. Tavenner. Were you able to fulfill that request ?

General Willoughby. Yes.

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, General Willoughby has filed a copy of his report with the staff. This report has been invaluable in the preparation of this hearing and in various investigations which the committee has from time to time conducted relating to these mat- ters, and will be used consistently throughout the conduct of his hear- ing, both by the witness and by me as counsel.

General Willoughby, are you acquained with Yoshikawa Mitsusada ?

General Willoughby. Yes, I am, over a number of years. He is a brilliant Japanese lawyer, long in government service, and I con- gratulate the committee on having obtained his appearance here and his statement in the general premises.

Mr. Velde. Would you spell his name, please, General ?

General Willoughby. Y-o-s-h-i-k-a-w-a, surname, M-i-t-s-u-s-a-d-a ; Yoshikawa Mitsusada.

Mr. Tavenner. You are aware of the fact that he testified before this committee regarding certain affidavits which are included in the exhibits prepared by you ?

General Willoughby. Yes; I was very happy to obtain this infor- mation through press reports, and consider his contribution, that is, his authentication, of correlated Sorge data as important, perhaps

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1169

supplemental to the equally important authentication by a battery of American lawyers in Tokyo.

Mr. Tavennee. These affidavits were executed by Mr. Yoshikawa in 19 19 at the request of your command, attest ing to the aul henl icity of the Sorge interrogations and confessions which he personally observed. That is true, isn't it \

General Willougiiry. Yes, indeed.

Mr. Tavennee. A persual of the exhibits, which are in the posses- sion of the committee, indicates a quite extensive and sincere effort on the part of American authorities since the occupation to establish beyond any question of a doubt the validity of the Japanese trials of Sorge and his co-defendants, and the validity of the police investiga- tions in the Sorge case, and the authentic character of the records which you have produced here.

With reference to this aspect of your investigation, what did you do to establish the validity of the trials, according to our concept of trials, and the authenticity of the records?

General Wellottghby. I am very glad to take advantage of your question, Mr. Counsel, because juridical authentication, if presented at this time to the satisfaction of the committee, appears to me essential for the entire range of documentation that is submitted. We felt in 1949, although the reports date back to 1947, that that authentica- tion was desirable because a question had been raised — primarily by Miss Smedley at the time, utilizing all the facilities of publicity so generously placed at her disposal — and that we should go over this case again and have the material notarized in the approved technical manner prescribed by American law.

Without going into details, I would like to go on record with ref- erence to so-called exhibit 12, including the G-2 comments previously described, as follows

Mr. Velde. Before you go into that I would like to ask you what you meant by the statement you made with reference to Agnes Smed- ley and her use of the press and use of the fact that these documents were not authenticated ?

General Willotjghby. I get your point, Mr. Velde. We will have to go back to comparatively ancient history as far as I am concerned, namely, that when the report was published by the War Department in 1949, in February of 1949, Miss Smedley, assisted by Mr. John Rogge. her attorney, protested the entire publication, charged the contents as being false, untrue or illegal, and obtained, shall we say, a generous allocation of radio broadcast time and the full support of that portion of the American press which has been ascribed by refer- ence to the coloration pink, fellow-traveling, or pale rose, as the case may be.

That statement by her was given, as you recall, extraordinary pub- licity at the time. Our response to that was probably one of acquies- cence and a desire to go over the evidence once more, this time with the support of competent American legal opinion, which is the purpose of my reading.

My reaction personally at the time was to accept Miss Smedley's threat of suit for libel which she flung into the airways and which I unhesitatingly accepted at the time. She did not press her suit, or rather, her lawyer. I believe a Mr. John Rogge, did not press this suit, for obvious reasons.

1170 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

Mr. Velde. Was any suit filed by Agnes Smedley at all for libel?

General Willoughby. No. My reference to this legal opinion of authentication is related to your question. We felt that a report by an investigative agency should be good enough, considering that this agency has a record of long service, but we also felt that since reputa- ble American legal advice was available in Tokyo, that we should call on them, and they are: Messrs. J. Woodall Greene, member of the Maryland Bar; Joseph S. Carusi, member of the Connecticut Bar; Franklin E. N. Warren, member of the Oklahoma Bar and member of the New Mexico Bar.

These men occupied high positions in the occupation headquarters, and are on duty there now.

In addition to this American talent, we also employed, because of the language element, the services of an international Japanese-British firm : Messrs. E. V. A. de Becker and R. Usami, member, Middle Tem- ple, London; member, Inner Temple, London; member, Tokyo Bar.

Upon examination, item for item, and notarization of the docu- ments, these gentlemen made the following signed summation statement :

We, the undersigned, fully realizing that certain processes and procedures are necessary for the authentication or verification of documentary evidence before they may be introduced in courts of record in the United States, or be used as a basis for evidence, have examined the methods and procedures used for the authentication and verification of the documents listed, and after having duly considered the testimony of witnesses and having examined their written state- ments and interrogations, together with their seals and signatures appended thereto, have arrived at the conclusion that the authentication and verification of the documents, including the statements from witnesses, is in accordance with existing laws and procedures.

We, therefore, certify that it is our opinion that the authentication and veri- fication of each of the several documents mentioned —

And I am now speaking of this entire collection, both here and in the Shanghai files —

is legally sufficient to give legal standing to their full use within the scope of the rules of civil procedures for the courts of the United States, or foreign courts adhering to Anglo-American jurisprudence.

If the committee desires, there is additional opinion by the Judge Advocate of General Headquarters, Tokyo, Japan. With your per- mission I will file an abbreviated extract, if I may. This is taken from exhibit No. 14, one of these folders. It is entitled, "Opinion of Legal Section, Far East Command, Opinion of the Judge Advocate General, Far East Command and Related Matter." [Reading :]

In further support of the opinions of prominent American, British, and Japa- nese lawyers, currently employed in various civil sections, Headquarters Tokyo, there is enclosed herewith the opinion of legal section, Far East Command.

In this opinion, legal section, Far East Command, supports the conclusions of the Sorge Spy Ring report of December 15, 1947, and attests to the value of the documentary evidence on hand in G-2, Far East Command.

In their brief, legal section, Far East Command, points out and concurs in the general appraisal of evidence in this report, viz:

(i) The evidence has definite probative value.

(ii) Ample basis and justification for the report.

(iii) Evidence is considered to have a rational probative force.

(iv) It is considered acceptable to reasonable men.

(v) It is of type employed in congressional investigation committees.

Apparently, as of the date of this opinion, which is 2 to 3 years old, we had a feeling, in our correspondence with this committee, that

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1171

sooner or later this material might become of more than local interest. [Continuing reading:]

(vi) There is strong evidence of careful Japanese investigation.

(vii) No indication of employment of force or manufactured testimony.

(viii) Statements of various accused arc mutually corroborative.

(ix) The (l-J. report December 15, L947, was justified and properly made.

Mr. Tavf.xxki:. Mr. Chairman, at this time T would like fco offer in evidence the exhibit formerly identified by Yoshikawa Mitsusada and marked for identification only as "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 2," and ask that it be marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 37."

Mr. Wood. Let it be admitted.

(The document above referred to, marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 37," is filed herewith.)

Mr. W alter. Is that the exhibit that was marked when Mr. Yoshikawa testified?

Mr. Tavenner. Yes. This exhibit, it will be recalled, consists of the first draft in German of the Sorge confession and its English translation. According to the testimony of Mr. Yoshikawa, this con- fession was not accepted on the ground that it was inadequate, and Mr. Yoshikawa, in his individual capacity retained possession of this draft. Subsequently, Richard Sorge completed his confession and as the contents of this document are embraced within the completed confession, it will not be necessary to allude to it further.

General Willoughby, I now call your attention to a document en- titled '"Sorge Case Materials, Part I of Translation of Statement of Richard Sorge," dated February 1942, and immediately following that document, "Sorge Case Materials, Part II of Translation of State- ment of Richard Sorge," dated April 1942, which appear in your report under these titles. These two documents appear also in the consecutive exhibits as 20-A and 20-B. Will you tell the committee the genesis of this document and what it comprises ?

General Willoughby. Identified as classified by you, its full and official title, translated from the Japanese, is known as "Sorge Case Materials." It consists of two parts : "Part 1 of Translation of State- ment of Richard Sorge" and "Part 2 of Translation of Statement of Richard Sorge." It was published by the Ministry of Justice in its Criminal Affairs Bureau.

The foreword, I believe, Mr. Chairman, describes its content. The foreword is contained on the first page of a special number, No. 191, and marked "Top secret," top secret at the time as applied to the Japa- nese Government, a very interesting sidelight, if I may digress.

When this ring was discovered and the members of the ring ar- rested, a very leisurely investigative process ensued, because the Japa- nese Government at that time was in a state of neutrality with Soviet Russia and did not wish to disturb this by the implication contained in this case. For that reason, the publications were marked "Secret" and were handled with very considerable delicacy. It was some years later when it became apparent to the Japanese Government that the Soviet neutrality would soon end. Then they proceeded with more vigor in this case, to the extent of condemning the principals Sorge and Ozaki.

I now proceed with the reading of the foreword, to comply with the request of counsel.

1172 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

Mr. Velde. General Willoughby, can you fix the period of this neu- trality between Japan and Russia a little more exactly?

General Willoughby. Yes. Our war entry is December 7, 1941. And, incidentally, Sorge will have something to say about this in his coded messages to Moscow. The Japanese Government felt it pru- dent, shall we say, or within the realm of their international purposes, to enter into a neutrality agreement with the Soviets.

Mr. Tavenner. That was in April 1941 as Matsuoka was returning from Germany to Japan ?

General Willoughby. Yes ; some months prior to our entry into the war.

Mr. Velde. Approximately how long prior to our entry into the war was this period of neutrality, as you call it ?

General Willoughby. Six months, roughly. Roughly 6 months would cover the period of negotiation, of weighing and balancing favorable and unfavorable factors and the decision to develop a neu- trality pact with Russia.

Mr. Velde. General, in your investigations did you find any evidence that the Russian Government was aware of the planned attack on Pearl Harbor?

General Willoughby. Yes, Mr. Velde ; and, if I am permitted the liberty of suggesting, the counsel has provided for that in a later ques- tion.

Mr. Velde. I withdraw the question.

General Willoughby. And I am sure he will call your attention to it. Your question is well taken and is an important historical ele- ment. They did get the information. We will read, probably, the contents of that message later on. In other words, they knew in advance what was going to happen, and I wish I had known it in advance, too. We were then sweating it out in the Philippines, know- ing that the Philippines would be a very probable target.

Mr. Walter. May I ask a question at this point, General ?

General Willoughby. Certainly.

Mr. Walter. The Ozaki you mentioned was the political adviser to Konoye, and Ozaki was a Communist agent ?

General Willoughby. Yes. He was the closest right-hand man to Dr. Sorge. It is a sort of astonishing piece of information that an intimate of the Prime Minister of Japan, with access to the secrets of the Foreign Office of Japan, should also be an intimate of a Russian- controlled espionage identity.

Mr. Walter. He was more than an intimate ; wasn't he the political adviser to Konoye ?

General Willoughby. Yes. I think we will cover that later on, but I will be glad to outline it to you. Ozaki belonged to a group of political experts. He was rated as an expert on China and the Man- churian Railway, and as such he was a consultant to the Foreign Office; that was actually his official position. But he was more than that, because he developed an intimate personal relationship with the Prime Minister, who had around him what was then known as a group of bright young men around the Foreign Office who met with the Prime Minister at irregular intervals in an informal fashion at break- fast, and sometimes at dinner, and became known as the Breakfast Club. The Breakfast Club meant something to the Japanese, although it meant nothing to us until the development of the Sorge story. We

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1173

found there a local related group of consultants and Foreign Ollice officials who were to some extent responsible for at least the dra I' l Lng of foreign policy, and this man was a member of t Ids powerful and influ- ential group. What he found he immediately relayed to his boss and associate. Dr. Sorge, who put it on his radio station which he main- tained, and it was relayed to Khabarovsk, the Russian official relay station in Siberia, and then onward to Moscow.

So, this extraordinary man, this Dr. Sorge, had access on the one hand to the inner councils of the Japanese Government, and on the other hand to the inner councils of the German Government, because he occupied the position of press attache to the German Embassy in Tokyo. In other words, he got it coming and going.

Mr. Tavenner. Didn't he also have access to more or less a degree to the inner councils of the British Foreign Office?

General Willoughby. Yes. His ring involved an English subject,, Guenther Stein, who was persona grata with the British Foreign Office in Tokyo.

He also had access at one time or another to American information through Smedley and her associates.

Mr. Tavenner. May I suggest, General, that to go into the details of this matter now, which you are doing in response to my question,, may rather interfere with the orderly development of the testimony ; and I suggest, if satisfactory to the committee, that we proceed more or less in chronological order.

General Willoughby. Very good. Needless to say, I am delighted to respond to a question by Mr. Walter, but I was aware

AIr. Tavenner. Well, I asked the question about the British, and I realize we are getting deeply into testimony with which we will be concerned later.

General Willoughby. Indeed, sir.

In order to get back on the track, your last inquiry was the identi- fication of Sorge Case Materials, and I suggested that the foreword of the document is self-explanatory. I will read this foreword, which should dispose of this important document :

The German Richard S'orge entered the German Communist Party in 1919, was sent to Comintern headquarters —

Russian headquarters —

in January 1925, immediately became a member of the Russian Communist Party, joined the staff of the Comintern intelligence department and engaged in espionage activities in the northern European nations, China and elsewhere. He was ordered to serve as a spy in Japan in 1933, went to that country as a corre- spondent for the Frankfurter Zeitung, organized a secret espionage ring, includ- ing the German Max Klausen, a member of the German Communist Party and radio technician sent out by the same Soviet intelligence authorities; the Yugo- slav and member of the French Communist Party, Branko de Voukelitch, the United States Communist Party member Miyagi Yotoku, who had been sent to Japan by his party to perform espionage work —

I pause here to point out the significance of the international recruit- ment by which this man was furnished a member of the French Com- munist Party, a member of the American Communist Party, and a member of the German Communist Party as a part of his working staff. With reference to your question, Mr. Walter [continuing reading] :

the political adviser to the Chinese Comnmnist Party Ozaki Hozumi, whom.' Sorge himself had recruited around 1930 in Shanghai —

1174 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

In other words, Ozaki Hozumi, in the early part of the 1930's, irre- spective of his future high official position with the Japanese Govern- ment, was also listed by Sorge as a political adviser to the Chinese Communist Party in 1930. There are many items I have either for- gotten or that the detailed investigation has brought forth. [Contin- uing reading:]

and others, and directed and supervised the said ring in the collection and trans- mission to Soviet headquarters, either in writing or via radio, of information concerning military affairs, foreign relations, politics, economics, and other mis- cellaneous subjects.

The contents of the present printed document comprise part 1 of a translation of typewritten German notes prepared by Sorge in lieu of a statement at the direction of the Tokyo District Criminal Court.

Mr. Tavenner. At this point, I desire to offer in evidence as "Wil- loughy Exhibit No. 38" the German notes and the English translation referred to as being a part of consecutive exhibit 20-A.

Mr. Wood. It will be received.

( The document above referred to, marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 38," is filed herewith.)

Mr. Tavenner. All right; if you will proceed to part 2.

General Willoughby. Part 2 has an identical title. Its foreword merely consists of this description :

This document comprises the second and last part of a translation by the Procurator's Bureau of the Tokyo District Criminal Court of typewritten German notes prepared by Richard Sorge in lieu of a statement.

Mr. Tavenner. I desire at this time to offer in evidence so much of consecutive exhibit 20-B, both in the German text and in the English translation, as conforms to the witness' description.

Mr. Wood. It will be received.

(The document above referred to, marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 39," is filed herewith.)

Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, these two documents, marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 38" and "Willoughby Exhibit No. 39," are what is known as the Sorge confession ; are they not ?

General Willoughby. Yes; they are, though the correct title has been read by me now, namely, "Sorge Case Materials." We finally gave it a convenient title of our own out in Tokyo; namely, "Sorge s Own Story." Actually, it is a rather loose designation. They are not confessions; they are not really Sorge's own story; they are not a diary ; but they contain elements of all three, and you are at liberty to refer to them as you choose. We have used those terms indiscrimi- nately for some time.

Mr. Tavenner. And the translation of the title of the document itself, the printed title which I read, is "Parts 1 and 2 of the Statement of Richard Sorge" ?

General Willoughby. Sorge Case Materials.

Mr. Tavenner. Let me put the question this way : There is no diary or confession by Sorge separate and apart from the document which I introduced a moment ago, previously marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit 2," and these two documents, "Willoughby Exhibit 38" and "Willoughby Exhibit 39," which have just been introduced?

General Willoughby. There is none.

Mr. Walter. As I understand it, when Yoshikawa put the story together and reduced it to typewritten sheets, they were submitted to Sorge and he initialed them ; isn't that correct ?

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1175

General Willoughby. I think he made corrections. The original I have seen shows ink entries of a leisurely, editorial, corrective process.

Mr. Walter. Did he initial each page?

General Willoughby. I don't recall that point, but I have accepted this particular document at full face value.

Mr. Walter. It is just as much a confession as though the entire thing had been written by his own hand ?

Genera] Willoughby. I think your point is well taken. The man wrote it and filed it juridically, and I believe you could accept that classification, sir.

Mr. Taykn'xkk. This confession or statement by Richard Sorge, comprising exhibits 38 and 39, is very long. They are very interest- ing, Mr. Chairman. They go with great detail into the history of the Communist Party and the Comintern in the East ; but, as they are ex- hibits, we will not undertake to read the documents. I would like, however, to question the witness more or less in a chronological fash- ion regarding matters that are set forth in the diary.

General Willoughby, I call your attention to page 14 of part 1 of exhibit 38, in which there appears chapter 4, entitled "The Writer's Espionage Group and Activities in China Between January 1930 and December 1932." Will you please give the committee the benefit of the information contained therein relating to the organization of this group? In referring to "the writer," I was referring to Richard Sorge.

General Willoughby. I think extracts from this very voluminous exhibit, which is available in totality, will give the story. For ex- ample, when he speaks of the organization of the China group he has this to say :

I came to China with two foreign coworkers who had been dispatched on or- ders from the fourth bureau of the Red army.

That is a rather significant line. They had been dispatched on orders from the fourth bureau of the Red army. The fourth bureau of the Red army is the intelligence section of the Soviet army, and Sorge says he came to China with two coworkers who had been fur- nished him by the fourth bureau of the Red army. That indicates he was working for the fourth section of the Soviet army ; he was an operator, an agent, an under-cover agent, so to speak, of the intelli- gence section of the Soviet army.

Now, he says :

The only person in China upon whom I knew I could depend was Agnes Smed- ley, of whom I had first heard in Europe. I solicited her aid in establishing my group in Shanghai and particularly in selecting Chinese coworkers. I met as many as possible of her young Chinese friends, making special efforts to be- come acquainted with those who volunteered to cooperate and work with foreigners for leftist causes.

Then later on, to pick another significant fragment, he said :

I used the same method in obtaining foreign coworkers for my espionage group. At first I selected people from among Smedley's friends, approaching them by asking Smedley to introduce me to them and then waiting until I could negotiate with them directly.

Then this will interest Mr. Walter :

It was in that way that I met Ozaki, and I think Smedley was the one who introduced us. After that Smedley and I met Ozaki frequently at Smedley's home.

1176 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

He goes on in the same vein in this lengthy description of his operations.

Mr. Tavenner. I call your attention to page 15 of this same exhibit 28, where there appears subtitle C, entitled "Methods Used in Collec- tion of Information by Japanese Members; Methods of Contacting Japanese Members," and ask you to tell the committee what Sorge had to say about his contacts with Japanese members.

General Willoughey. Here again I make some selective references to his statements because they are descriptive of his work. He said :

My meetings with Japanese members took place at restaurants, cafes or Smedley's home * * *. I felt most at ease when we met at Smedley's home, and I took Ozaki and Kawai there on many occasions.

May I pause here to identify this man Kawai, K-a-w-a-i ? Kawai is a member of Sorge's ring, arrested, tried, and convicted, whom we released under the political amnesty following the occupation of Japan. We released a lot of people under the casual classification of political prisoners. The fact that they included convicted espionage agents and a slight assortment of murderers was incidental. We were too busy with the occupation of Japan to go into case histories. Later we got those people.

Kawai became important because he is an actual living eyewitness of this association with Smedley and others, has said so, his affidavit is available, and were funds available he could have been brought before this committee.

Mr. Tavenner. In that connection, General, is it not correct that he is one of the two individuals of whom this committee wrote you regarding the taking of his deposition by this committee during April 1950 when a subcommittee was in Hawaii ?

General Willoughby. Quite. I am glad you reminded me of it, Mr. Counsel, and it shows that this committee has been actually work- ing on this case over a long period.

This affidavit was prepared in lieu of a personal appearance, and it has the same probative value.

In other words, if Smedley and her lawyers in her days — and she had to defend herself, of course ; I had no objection then or now to this attitude — if she maintained this was a typical forced Japanese disclosure, it has been supported by witnesses of high standing willing to make that statement before an American investigative group such as this one. Kawai is in a more important category than Ozaki be- cause you can summon him if you want to, though he has made a sworn statement, notarized, and so forth.

Mr. Velde. You have mentioned meetings between Ozaki and Kawai in Smedley's home. Can you place the time they were held and where was Smedley's home ?

General Willottghby. These conferences were in the city of Shanghai. Smedley and Stein were never active in Japan, and refer- ence to her is as to her work as Sorge's assistant in Shanghai. Later on — and I did not know it at the lime — our interest in the Sorge file brought confirmation of that in the Shanghai police records. A Japa- nese court record of an espionage ring points to activities in Shanghai, and that is confirmed by a later investigation of collateral supporting information of identical quality by a reputable international policing body, the Shanghai municipal police, which at that time was an extra- territorial enclave in China.

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF .RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1177

Mr. Velde. You think the evidence such I hat il would sal isfy almost any American court?

Genera] Willoughby. Yes. 1 would accept it.

Mr. Vki.dk. What was the period?

General Willoughby. 1929 to 1934. Am I correct about that, Mr. Counsel? As a matter of fact, the counsel to this committee lias be- come much more expert than I am on these files.

Mr. T.wk.nxkr. 1 think the interrogation will indicate' that these particular conferences took" place in L932 and the last one in 1933, so far as Kawai is concerned.

General Willoughby. I was tempted to throw into the hopper the Shanghai police document.

Mi'. Tavkxxki;. Before you do that, you referred to Guenther Stein not having been involved in Japan.

General Willoughby. I take that back.

Mr. Tavenner. Wasn't that an error?

General Willoughby. Yes. That was a slip of the tongue, an error. Smedley was not in Japan, but Guenther Stein was there. In fact, he ran a radio station for Sorge for a long time.

As to the relationship between the Sorge report, a Japanese report, and the report of the British and French concessions of the Shanghai municipal police, the committee holds in the Shanghai files a typical dossier containing an elaborate report and a typical index card on Smedley. This is a 5- by 3-inch index card, and it fixes the date.

"Shanghai municipal police" is written in the upper left-hand corner; file number; date, August 1933; American; age, 23/2/1892; height, 5 feet G inches; hair, brown; eyes, gray; face, oval. I would say a rather slipshod description.

Antecedents: Agnes Smedley, alias Alice Bird, alias Mrs. Petroikos, American citizen horn in Osgoo, Mo., United States of America, on February 23, 1892. Member of the following societies.

That is rather interesting. From 1933 to 1951 we have heard of such lists elsewhere, where fellow travelers and joiners join certain fronts. [Continuing reading:]

Friends of the U. S. S. R., Hindustan Association in Berlin, Berlin Indian Revolutionary Society, Noulens Defense Committee —

The "Noulens Defense Committee" is a forerunner of the Civil Eights Congress; it works in Shanghai on the same principle as the Civil Eight Congress works in New York City now ; namely, legal defense of Communists caught in the business.

Mr. Walter. What is the American counterpart ?

General Willoughby."1 The Civil Rights Congress. I will trace it from its noble birth to its American tendrils.

Mr. Walter. Noble birth? I would say birth out of wedlock.

General Willoughby. I accept your fine genealogical nuance, Mr. Walter. [Continuing reading:]

All China Labor Federation, and the China League for Civil Rights. Speaks English, French, and German and is in possession of two passports — German and American.

I will show individuals with 15 passports. [Continuing reading:]

Arrived in Shanghai in May in2D from Berlin as the correspondent of the German newspaper Frankfurter Zeitung. 90929—51 4

1178 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

That is the same cover Sorge had, who was also a correspondent for the Frankfurter Zeitung. [Continuing reading:]

She is in the service of the eastern branch of the central committee of the Communist International and is definitely known to have assisted local Indian seditionists on several occasions during the past few years. It is believed that her chief duties comprise the supervising of Communist organizations among workers and that she receives orders direct from the central committee of the Communist International in Moscow.

This is a statement by the Shanghai municipal police, who did not then know or have, of course, Sorge's record, known here as exhibit 38, but they had a fair knowledge of it. [Continuing reading :]

May 1929 to May 15, 1930—85 Avenue Dubail. May 15, 1930, to October 1930— Canton, and French concession, Shameen. October 1930 — 72 Route Groushy —

A Shanghai street. [Continuing reading :]

January 22, 1931, to March 5, 1931— Nanking. June 16, 1931, to July 5, 1931— Canton. December 1931 — removed to apartment 102, I. S. S. Apartments, 1552 Avenue Joffre.

On May 17, 1933, she left Shanghai by rail for Peiping. Unconfirmed informa- tion is to the effect that she intends to proceed to Moscow. October 23, 1934 — returned to Shanghai —

A lapse of 2 years. [Continuing reading :]

from the United States, in the S. S. President Coolidge —

And so forth and so forth.

Behind this brief, typical index card maintained by the Shanghai police, there is a more extensive file, but here is a rough fixation of the time period, views of the British police, her aliases and her asso- ciations, in broad outline, of which a more complete record is going to be filed by the counsel.

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Willoughby, I call your attention to section F, page 16, part 1, of the document referred to — that is, exhibit 38 — which is entitled, "Persons Directly Attached to Writer's Chinese Group," and by "writer" I am referring to Richard Sorge.

Will you tell the committee what Richard Sorge had to say about this subject?

General Willoughby. With reference to foreigners, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. Tavenner. Yes. It is section F.

General Willoughby. Yes, sir. I have it. Here, again, I act as an assistant counsel in protecting the limited time of the committee and picking out what I know from my long experience to be the high lights. This is the type of comment he makes on his foreign associates. He has one by the name of Seber Weingarten :

Weingarten, the man in charge of wireless operations in my group, remained in Shanghai after I returned to Moscow. He was a graduate of the radio school in Moscow who had been ordered by headquarters to work with me.

He has this to say about Agnes Smedley, though he has other things to say in other parts of this document :

She was an American and a correspondent of the German newspaper Frank- furter Zeitung. She was used in Shanghai by me as a direct member of my group. She worked for me very competently.

Then there are a number of code and surnames. Some we have identi- fied ; others we suspect ; and others we don't know who they are. One was John :

John — He was sent to Shanghai to work for me by the fourth bureau of the Red Army in 1931. Although he acted as my proxy in a few liaison

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1179

duties, he was chiefly concerned with code :md photographic work. He was a Pole, a former member of the Polish Communist Tarty.

Here we have an interesting one. By cross reference to Sorge and the Shanghai police, we have been able to establish his identity :

Paul — He was designated as my successor by the fourth bureau of the Red Army. While I was in Shanghai, he was chiefly concerned with military mat- ters, on which he was an expert. He became the leader of the group after I left.

Here, while the mater is covered more extensively later on, I would like to pause and read to you again one of those police identities, and it is in line with the purposes of this committee. In a general manner, this is what I said in my correspondence with Washington :

The significance of this material of yesterday is that it, carries into tomorrow. Time in its issue of April 25, 11)49, featured Eugene Dennis. There is no point in repeating this terse, well-writen story of the growth and world itinerary of a Soviet agent ; important, however, are certain connecting links with the Sorge case.

Dennis, who used to be Francis X. Wahlron, obtained a fraudulent passport as 'Paul Walsh'* and traveled via Europe, South Africa to China. The world-wide ramifications of the Third International, with Shanghai as the far eastern operating center, are reflected in the itinerary of this prominent American disci- ple. Paul Eugene Walsh, alias "Paul" or "Milton," suddenly appears in the records of the Shanghai police.

The Shanghai police had the same type of card on him as I read to you on Smedley.

Mr. Tavenner. And a person designated by the name Paul is said by Sorge to have been his successor at Shanghai ?

General Willoughby. Yes. Here I am quoting the Shanghai police report :

Name : Paul Eugene Walsh ; alias Milton. Date and place of birth : Unknown. Address in Shanghai : 35-D, 643 Route Frelupt.

Particulars of passport : American Passport No. 331741 issued by the Depart- ment of State, Washington, D. C. on 12.12.1930. When and how Walsh arrived in Shanghai are unknown, as are his previous activities. From December 1, 1933, until June 1, 1934, he resided at Flat 0, Gresham Apartments, No. 1224 Avenue Joffre. On May 30, 1934, the lease of Flat 34-D, Foncim Apartments, No. 643 Route Frelupt, was transferred to his name from Harry Berger —

This is important. Harry Berger is a well-known international Com- munist identity. [Continuing reading:]

with whom he was obviously on terms of good friendship. Walsh resided at the latter address from June 1, 1934, until October 9, 1S34, when he secretly left Shanghai for Trieste on the S. S. Conte Verde. It has been established —

says the Shanghai police —

that Walsh was one of the master minds of the local machine of the Comintern, and as such was responsible for the collation of many important documents re- lating to the propagation of Communist ideas in the Far East.

Now, Sorge describes this particular Comintern machine, and we will read it shortly. Sorge does not always give complete identities. He was cautious, even in his story, because he hoped against hope, from 1941 to 1944, that the Soviets would intervene and rescue him from his predicament.

The cross-reference, Mr. Velde, is that this Comintern apparatus or machine with which the police associates him, and which is de- scribed fully by Sorge as to its purposes, was founded by Earl Browder,

1180 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

the head of the American Communist Party. It was Dennis who took the place of Browder. That constitutes the value of this pseudo- historical tracing of fine lines of relationship which is one of the tasks of this committee and one of the tasks of the Tokyo intelligence system.

Mr. Velde. Do I get you right that the corroboration consists of the Shanghai police reports, which mention the names of Browder, Dennis, and others, and they are also contained in the Sorge file ?

General Willoughby. Yes ; either in code name or surname.

Mr. Walter. General, you stated that some of the names you merely suspected. Have you pursued all avenues of investigation to determine who they were, and do you think we might well look further for the identity of these persons ?

General Willoughby. We have done practically all we could in the Orient, but when you encounter identities of persons, then the local investigative agencies, including your committee, would pursue this, and it is my understanding this is being done. American investiga- tive agencies have become interested in these clues or leads or refer- ences, and this case might still be said to be open, in that whenever such unidentified or partially identified individuals appear the investigative processes are in course now. These sources are not available to me, since I left my post under dramatic circumstances 60 days ago.

Mr. Tavenner. I might add to what you have said that, where the identities of persons in Japan have been made available to the com- mittee, this committee is endeavoring to ascertain where they are now and what they are doing.

General Willoughby. May I compliment the counsel and this com- mittee. I was surprised at the amount of information this committee has on persons whose names appear in the oriental files. I am sure this will be brought out in the course of these hearings. I have a feeling that a number of these identities are already known and have been investigated on parallel lines by this committee.

Mr. Tavenner. There are some names we do not desire to disclose at this time.

General Willoughby. The committee controls the subject matter.

Mr. Tavenner. Have you completed your answer to the question relating to section F %

General Willoughby. Yes. I have picked a few of his comments.

Mr. Tavenner. Will you turn back to section F, page 17? I do not believe you have completed your testimony with regard to that.

General Willoughby. Your point is well taken, sir. Sorge lists a few more which are important, such as Max Klausen :

Klausen, who went to Shanghai before I did, handled wireless operations for his operator, a man known as Jim. He wasi attached to the Fourth Bu- reau of the Red Army in Moscow. I first met him in his role of wireless operator in Shanghai. He worked for me for quite a while at Canton, although not as an active member, after which he was transferred to a group in Man- churia. I knew he was an able man ; so I proposed at Moscow in 1935 that he be sent to Japan.

Klausen, Sorge's radio operator, established radio stations both in Shanghai and Tokyo, used to relay messages to Khabarovsk, Siberia, which were then relayed to Moscow.

Klausen is well remembered by me because he was released in Tokyo under this political amnesty, and he disappeared. He disap- peared with the assistance of the Soviet Embassy. That started me,, actually, in tracking down this case. I felt if this individual, or any

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1181

individual of this crowd, was that important, that this thing was an international case. We found later on, as will be developed by the counsel in connection with exhibit 17, that an attempt was made to get this Sorge case in the International Tribunal in Tokyo, where it met strong opposition by the Russian member; again, to any trained intelligence or investigative ollicer, indicative of the impor- tance of this material.

We will come to that later.

Mr. Tavenner. It appears that after a discussion of the paragraph relating to Paul in Sorge's statement, you omitted the next threei paragraphs. When you returned to the records relating to Paul you failed to pick them up. So, will you go back to the paragraph be- ginning "A German woman"?

General Willoughby. Oh, yes. We find an entry :

A German woman who was called "Hamburg." She offered us the use of her home and engaged in various liaison functions, such as performing mes- senger duties and holding materials for us.

The next entry relates to Jacob :

Jacob — a young American newspaper reporter. For the most part he gathered various kinds of political information from foreigners.

I have not been able to obtain an identification on this entry.

Mr. Tavenner. Have you been able to identify the newspaper for which the individual worked as a reporter?

General Willoughby. I am sorry to say, no.

Mr. Walter. Does the record disclose his first name, his given name ?

General Willoughby. Just "Jacob," which could be his code name or his surname. You find some names like "Hamburg," who is prob- ably Miss Weitemeyer, and there is a great deal known about her. These were clues to descriptive activities, such as a spy-ring apparatus.

Mr. Tavenner. There is still another paragraph.

General Willoughby. Which one ?

Mr. Tavenner. It begins with "A young employee."

General Willoughby. Oh, yes:

A young employee of the American consulate who brought in economic and political news.

Sorge then says :

I have forgotten his name.

Sorge hoped for 4 years that someone would "spring" him. He bragged to the Japanese: "I am an important Soviet operator; I hold the rank of colonel in the Soviet Army," and so forth. He played on the desire of the Japanese to have no friction with the Russians during the war years, the neutrality arrangement. So, we felt that his own statements were more or less influenced by this cautious, protective attitude. But the systematic interrogation of other members of his ring brought out other facts, and that shows the importance of your witness, Yoshikawa Mitsusada.

Mr. Velde. As to this young employee of the American consulate, is there any corroborating evidence in the Shanghai police records ?

General Willoughby. Our efforts were to try to grab the Shanghai files. Everything points to Shanghai as headquarters, with Tokyo an outpost. We tried to do that, but we were charged with the occu- pation of Japan, a nation of 80 million, and my job was not to pursue

1182 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

these juicy morsels, but to keep a sort of FBI surveillance in Japan and to maintain tranquillity in Japan. So, we could not engage in activities in China.

I am continually charged with failure to obtain information else- where. It would be the same as if the FBI was giving you the records of the French Surete Nationale in Paris. We have done all we could to track down these "birds." Actually, I was less interested in getting the dope on Jacob than on Earl Browder, Eugene Dennis, and Gerhart Eisler. They were in the headlines, and I feel if that had been known Judge Medina's job would have been easier.

Mr. Velde. Don't misunderstand me, General. I realize your juris- diction was limited to Japan and the Philippine Islands, as I understand it.

General Willoughby. Quite.

Mr. Velde. And you had no jurisdiction in Korea, either at that time ?

General Willoughby. I did not. Of course, I had interest and picked up everything that was not nailed down.

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Yoshikawa was asked the question whether or not effort had been made to identify the individual alleged to have been in the American consulate and furnishing information. His testimony was that they had been unable to establish his identity, but it is possible that the State Department has information that would lead to discovery of at least the names of persons in the consulate at that time, which is not your function, but probably our function.

General Willoughby. I feel that the committee is in a position to inquire from the State Department directly.

Mr. Tavenner. Yes, sir.

Section J on page 23 of the same document, exhibit 38, is entitled "Other Groups in China." The first group listed thereunder is the "Jim" or "Lehman" group. What does Sorge report on this group?

General Willoughby. With an eye on Mr. Velde, now we come to a portion of Sorge's own story which, on perusal, led me, or us, the investigative intelligence groups, to try to obtain further data on the operations in Shanghai, and it is this portion of the Sorge story which, while cautiously worded, nevertheless gave us really the bird's- eye view of the international Comintern character of the organizations then in Shanghai. When you read this and put yourselves in out- place, or my place, there was enough there — though Sorge, as usual, was conservative in his designations — enough of the purposes of these organizations to recognize a similar pattern in the United States. After we pursued this investigation which resulted in the Shanghai file and saw the picture that evolved from it, we felt that we then had a pattern recognizable in the United States.

For example, if we find Noulens is a type case of a protective legal defense of a captured convicted espionage agent which is an exact counterpart of the Civil Rights Congress, when we see that, we bring the report up to date.

When we find the same man — namely, Gerhart Eisler — operating in Japan, and find him later defended by — what is her name? Carol Wise?

Mr. Walter. Carol King.

Mr. Beale. Carol Weiss King.

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1183

General Willougiiby. Then there develops a pattern which must be known by the legislators and the people so that they can under- stand and identify these things. For example, I notice Mr. Saypol — I am speaking as a reader of several papers, such as the New York Times — though I don't feel so kindly as to the Herald Tribune; as a matter of fact, I wonder why New York requires the Herald Tribune when it has the Times. Is the Times man here? And including that unmatched series of papers known as the Hearst papers, completely in favor for years. Mr. Sentner [addressing reporter].

When we see that Gerhart Eisler is defended by an organization headed by Miss King, and we find Eisler in Shanghai, and find Noulens defended in Shanghai in a similar manner to Eisler's defense in the United States, then we can trace the Kremlin-sponsored, Comintern- created so-called International lied Aid, which became the Labor Defense in the States, which became the Civil Rights Congress and the Association for the Defense of the Foreign Born ; and that is a pattern which I think is of substance and value to the committee and the Congress and the people.

This is a departure from your question to introduce the importance of the description of these organizations. Xo doubt you will recog- nize them. They are operating in the States under some other name.

Mr. Tavenner. Will you read what Sorge had to say about the "Jim" or "Lehman" group?

General Willougiiby. That will take us a bit of time.

Mr. Tavenner. Then, Mr. Chairman, I believe this woidd be a good opportunity for a break.

Mr. Wood. The committee stands in recess until 2 : 30.

(Thereupon, at 12:40 p. m., a recess was taken until 2:30 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. CHARLES ANDREW WILLOUGHBY—

Resumed

Air. Tavenner. General Willougiiby, I refer you again to section J, on page 23, of exhibit No. 38. That section is entitled "Other Groups in China." The first group listed thereunder is the Jim or Lehman group. AVill you examine the exhibit, please, and state what the Sorge statement shows on this unit?

General W7illoughby. Mr. Counsel, I regard this section of the Sorge story as possibly' the most important in this documentation, because it led us to believe that, while fragmentary, the descriptions of these international people then working in Shanghai for the pur- pose of communizing China were so descriptive in their functional outline that we might have something of value to the American people today. And, actually, as I read these, I would like to suggest that you put yourselves in our positions in Tokyo, groping with this uncrystallized information at the time, and at the end of the reading realize we would have had to go after the Shanghai record or to pro- cure someone who would know about that activity.

1184 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

Consequently, this represents a turning point in the process 'of in- vestigation, in the sense that we had already disposed of Sorge, you might say, as an interesting specimen of international espionage somewhat in the manner of what was later disclosed in Canada ; but these next two pages, written by an individual who was in the busi- ness, an expert in his line, gave us the clue to the existence in Shanghai of a number of bodies that looked very much like the Communist fronts everywhere in the world, including America.

Here, again, we go into that twilight zone of why and how a his- torical case, so to speak — because everything of 5 or 10 years ago is in the realm of historical research— can be linked to something that is of interest to the committee today.

I will link it, or the counsel, through his questioning, will develop it, and I will pause in one of these groups and trace it from 1935 until 1951, in a comparatively brief statement.

Mr. Walter. Did your investigation develop a connection between that group and a group in the United States?

General Willotjghby. It did, unmistakably and positively, and that is of value to your committee, to get that on the record.

Mr. Tavenner. I suggest you read on page 23 the portion dealing with that group, that is, the Lehman group.

General Willotjghby. Yes, sir. This is a series of groups or appa- ratus or front organizations described by Sorge.

The first is the Jim or Lehman group, code name of the person in charge. He said :

The first group to work in Shanghai was the Jim group, also known as the Lehman group. I had never heard of it until I had arrived in Shanghai. Jim had been sent out from the fourth bureau of the Red army, arriving in Shanghai slightly before me. His chief duty was to establish radio communication between Shanghai and other parts of China and Moscow. * * * When I arrived in Shanghai, he had already succeeded in establishing radio communication between Shanghai and Moscow and was trying to establish contacts with other districts in a similar manner. However, it seems that he was unsuccessful in the case of Canton. Jim employed Klausen—

who became Sorge's radio operator —

as his subordinate. Futher, he employed a White Russian called Mischa or Mishin in Shanghai.

We do not know too much about Lehman. Does he appear in your files, Mr. Tavenner, L-e-h-m-a-n?

Mr. Tavenner. Whether it is the same Lehman or not, I am unable to say.

General Willoughry. Nevertheless, the sense of this description is that Shanghai is a radio-transmitting station or relay station en route to Khabarovsk and then Moscow The operator who appears here first, Klausen, later on used himself in establishing his own station in Tokyo.

Mr. Walter. When was that, approximately?

General Willougitby. In Japan in the period 1935 to 1941, roughly.

Mr. Tavenner. Will you proceed to the next group listed there, known as the Harbin group ?

General Willougiiby. Sorge says about this group :

The next group with which I came into contact in the course of my work was the Harbin group, which had also been sent out by the fourth bureau of the Red army.

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1185

You have this recurrent reference to his job description, namely, an agent of the fourth bureau of the Red army, the intelligence section of the Red army. [Continuing reading :]

Its duty was to gather military Informs I ion in Manchuria. As a sideline, it gath- ered political intelligence as well. The Harbin group acted as a letter box for me; I forwarded letters ami documents from Moscow to it. and it sent them on. Money sent to me by Moscow also came through this channel. Liaison with the Harbin group was established in the following way: To begin with, some- body from the group came to Shanghai to confer on the technique of the letter- box communication system, and thereafter members of my group and members of the Harbin group took turns in serving as mail carriers and traveling be- tween Harbin and Shanghai.

Klausen acted as contact lor me on numerous occasions. I believe it was in the spring of 1032 that I myself carried mail to Harbin.

The significance here is the carrier or mail delivery method which oc- curs throughout the technique of Sorge, that is, how such a ring oper- ates in a foreign country. And some of the names he mentioned ear- lier, in the main, were the ones he used again in Japan; and some of the names occurring now you will find recurring elsewhere as this presentation proceeds.

The next group

Mr. Tavenner. I believe you still have another paragraph to read in connection with the Harbin group.

General Willougiiby. Yes:

I met Ott-Gloemberg, chief of the Harbin group, for the first time in Shang- hai. I called on him at Harbin to turn over the mail to him. I also met Fro- lich, sometimes called Theo, who had formerly worked at Shanghai, at Harbin. I do not believe I met the radio technician, Artur, at Harbin, although I, heard about him. Theo and Ott-Gloemberg left Harbin in 1932. I happened to meet them by chance and not in connection with my work in Russia in January 1933. My relationship with the Harbin group was strictly a letter-box affair. There was no administrative relationship at all.

The significance there is that these elusive names appear elsewhere. The Shanghai record will pick them up. They had them under sur- veillance. There is your bridge from Sorge to Shanghai today. I keep repeating that, but it is a very practical element in these proceedings.

Mr. Tavexner. Now if you will describe the Frohlich-Feldmann group in Shanghai according to Sorge's statement.

General Willoughby. The next group reported on by Sorge is the Frohlich-Feldmann group in Shanghai. He said :

The Frohlich-Feldmann group was also operating in Shanghai in 1931. Like the others, it had been sent out by the fourth bureau of the Red army. Its duty was to make connections with the Chinese Red army and to gather intelligence concerning it.

Here Sorge reports on a staff, a group or front whose duty it was to do what? To make connection with the Chinese Red Army and to gather intelligence concerning it, an interesting sideline. [Continu- ing reading:]

It had its own radio connection with Moscow and therefore did not use our station. The chief of the group was Frohlich, also known as Theo, who held the rank of major general in the Red army. Feldmann was a radio technician and held the rank of lieutenant colonel. There was another man in the group, but I do not know who he was. Unable to fulfill their mission, these people left Shanghai during 1931. I had no working relationship with them and met them only by chance. Shanghai is such a small city that it was difficult to avoid such chance encounters. I did not receive instructions from Moscow to contact them. They had their own mission to perform and there was no formal con- nection between us.

1186 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

All of this, fragmentary to some extent, nevertheless describes the mechanics of the operation, and describes their missions. The duty of the Frohlich-Feldmann group was to gather intelligence concerning the Chinese Red army. That is the same Red army which we are now fighting in North Korea. Therefore, any collateral relationship that will develop, as the case may be, may have found its origin in the reading of this, shall we say, slightly historical case known as the Sorge case. Without that we would never have been interested in Shanghai at all. After all, we had a lot of more pressing questions. But that development was enough to make Shanghai an irresistible target of investigation.

The next group is a key group. Always bear in mind that Sorge is not going to identify this group by name, he is not ready to do this when he writes this paper, but he tells enough about it that we are able to establish its identity later on.

Mr. Tavenner. What is the name of the group to which you refer?

General Willoughbt. He calls it the Comintern group in Shanghai. I will give you the correct identity later. Sorge says :

I met the Comintern group in Shanghai by chance in 1931. It consisted of a political branch and an organization branch, the latter comprised of Noulens—

a name to which I invite your attention —

who became famous after his arrest, and one or two assistants. Karl Lesse later came to Shanghai to assume the post left vacant by Noulens. The organization branch bad various duties to perform, but it was primarily concerned with the maintenance of liaison between the Comintern, the Chinese Communist Party and the political branch of the Shanghai Comintern group. Liaison duty was of three* different types: (1) Personnel work, i. e., the movement of personnel be- tween Moscow and the Chinese Communist Party; (2) the transmittal of docu- ments and letters; and (3) radio communication. The organization branch also assumed the duty of financial liaison between Moscow, the Chinese Communist Party, and the political branch; assisted in finding meeting places and houses for the organization branch and the Chinese Communist Party ; rendered all kinds of technical and organizational assistance to illegal activities in China ; took an active part in the exchange of secret materials between Moscow and China ; and assumed responsibility for the safety of members of the political branch. In this last connection, it had the authority to issue orders to political branch mem- bers, restrict their movements, etc.

Now, this description of the job of this outfit is then later confirmed by the Shanghai files and other investigations which we conducted. Its name and personnel then is disclosed. Sorge did not disclose it except to refer to Noulens, which is a famous case quite similar to the defense of Gerhart Eisler, for the same reason and conducted by the same legalistic front which is used for such purposes, namely, the International Red Aid, a Communist-financed unit whose counter- part to the American organization will develop as we proceed.

Then Sorge describes the political branch :

The political branch consisted of Gerhardt —

Eisler ; I will supply the last name —

whom I had known in Germany and worked with in my Comintern days, and one or two assistants. I did not meet the assistants.

Incidentally, Eisler's wife * appeared before this committee quite recently, I believe.

1 Hede Massing, former wife of Gerhardt Eisler.

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1187

Mr. Taykxner. That is correct.

General Willoughby. In her book, This Deception, she knew In I Le about Eisler's China mission. 1 will put in a plug for Hede Massing's book, This Deception, published by Duell, Sloane <S Pearce, because one of the Pearces ol that company worked for me in Japan.

Sorge continues :

I chanced to meet Gerhardt [Eisler] in Shanghai and renewed our old acquaint- ance, but our work was absolutely unrelated. Gerhardt's duty, or rather that of the political branch, was to act as a spokesman for the political policy with respect to the Chinese Communist Party decided upon by the Comintern general conference. It also acted as an intermediary for the exchange of information between the Chinese Communist Party and the Comintern and submit tod reports concerning all the social problems involved in the labor movement in < 'hina. The reports were forwarded to Moscow through the organization branch. I must state here that these reports were never sent through my radio facilities or my other liaison channels. With the arrest of Noulens, Gerhardt's status in Shanghai became precarious, and he decided to return to Moscow in 1931.

He skipped, just as he did on the Batory. He is an internationally skillful dodger.

I would like to pause here. Knowing that the essence of this pres- entation is linked with today, this is too tempting an opportunity. Of course, Ave are now all familiar with the elusive Gerhart Eisler. I call your attention to an article in the Saturday Evening Post, in its issue of February 17, 1951. I pause, in fact, to pay tribute to the Saturday Evening Fost, as this article is brilliant. The author, Craig Thompson, unknown to me, is a most skillful investigator of Com- munist fronts.

The title of the article is "The Communist's Dearest Friend," and its lead photograph shows one Carol King, smiling amiably, I suppose, and leading by the hand her protege and client, one Gerhart Eisler.

Mr. Velde. General, is there any question in your mind that the Gerhart referred to by Richard Sorge is one and the same as Gerhart Eisler?

General Wieloughby. Xone whatever. We know he was in Shang- hai. The Shanghai police said he was. His wife said he was. He was not there for his health. Furthermore, the story of Sorge tells what he was doing.

Mr. Tavenxer. For the purpose of the record, I would like to refer to an interrogation which took place before this committee February 6, 1947, of Ruth Fischer, a sister of Gerhart Eisler :

Mr. Russell. When did you next learn of the whereabouts of your brother and what country was he in?

Miss Fischer. * * * Eisler had been in disgrace during 1928, 1929, and 1930, and everybody of the^Communist Party in Berlin expected his expulsion from the Communist Party of Germany because of his rebellion against Stalin at that time.

Then he was sent to a mission in China, with the GPU delegation, to purge rebellious Chinese Communists. At that time Eisler's mission was not a very high one, in China ; he was one of a group of men sent there to carry out orders. In these Chinese purges he behaved so cruelly and carried out the orders so well that the report about him in Berlin said that he was really the hangman of the rebellious Chinese Communists, who were sentenced by the decisions of Moscow.

After the Chinese trip, he came back in 1930 or 1931 to Moscow, where he then married his wife, and where his daughter was born, and where he remained until 1933. What missions he carried out between 1931 and 1933 I do not know, but I want to repeat that he has not walked on German soil in these years.

1188 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

General Willoughby. That is a very interesting interview, not known to me, and would merely confirm me in my current under- standing.

Mr. Tavenner. You were proceeding to discuss the article of Craig Thompson.

General Willoughby. Yes. This article, as of February 1951, covers the evaluation of organizations and the participation of Miss King in the development of a systematic legal defense for Commu- nist agents that have run afoul the American law.

The article says in 1925, in association with one Brodsky, who was the United States receiver of party funds from Moscow.

Mr. Wood. Who is that? Brodsky?

General Willoughby. B-r-o-d-s-k-y. Together they helped organ- ize and launch the International Labor Defense.

The records in Shanghai and elsewhere will show, in an organiza- tion chart which is included in my studies, that the International Red Aid is the Kremlin mother unit of defense bodies in all countries for the defense of this type of clientele.

So it became known as the Labor Defense in this country, and this article, with which I am in complete agreement, so states. The author, who knows his business, also says :

This effort had been preceded by a meeting in Moscow at which a directive, binding on Communist parties everywhere, was issued. It demanded : "The proletariat must gather and organize those lawyers and learned barristers in various countries who sympathize with the liberation struggle." From this was born a world-wide Communist bar association called International Red Aid. The International Labor Defense was its United States section.

Without going into details which are in this file, the International Red Aid, Soviet-Comintern sponsored, becomes the International Labor Defense, and the American Labor Defense becomes the Civil Rights Congress. And, incidentally, again Weiss, as an organizer, develops other agencies, such as the American Committee for the De- fense of the Foreign Born, and several other organizations, all of which have been analyzed and commented on adversely by Mr. Morris Ernst, a reputable New York lawyer, who resented, apparently, ever having been mixed up with this group.

The coincidence that Eisler and Noulens find legal counsel, one in China and one in New York, all connected with the International Red Aid, is so impressive that an investigative officer dare not ignore it.

Pausing again, in order to tie this thing into a recognizable pattern, you will find that what Sorge cautiously called the Comintern group, is reported by the Chinese police much more specifically. It will be covered later on, but I dwell on it now. It is the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, abbreviated PPTLTS. and its parent organization, the Shanghai branch of the Far Eastern Bureau. They were the most- important and highly organized apparatus for Comintern labor activi- ties in the Far East during the late 1920's and early 1930's.

The PPTUS, set up in 1927 at a conference in Hankow, was attended by several prominent Comintern leaders, including Lozovsky, who, incidentally, has risen to a high position in the Soviet labor movement. Another member of the Hankow conference who later became first head of the PPTUS was the American Communist Earl Browder, who was assisted in his work in China by an American woman. Other Americans prominent in the affairs of the PPTUS were James H.

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1189

Dolsen, a journalist, and one Albert Edward Stewart, and Margaret Undjus.

Mr. Tavenner. Did you idenf i i'y Jim Dolsen as one of the individu- als connected with this organization?

General Welloughby. Yes. He was connected with the organiza- tion in the thirties.

Mr. Velde. Will you spell that?

General Willoughby. D-o-l-s-e-n, James H.

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, Jim Dolsen is the person who has been identified as a member of the Communist Party by Matthew Cvetic in his testimony on February 21, 1950, and is one of those arrested on August 17, 1951, in Pittsburgh.

General Willotjghby. That is news to me. It again shows the efficacy of this committee's work in tracking down these people. This is why the Sorge and related matters could not be ignored. Here you have the case of an individual, Dolsen, trafficking in a Communist front in the thirties in China ; he recurs in Pittsburgh in the forties, and this committee picks him up and reports on him in this fashion. If you were pressed for time and decided to terminate this meeting now, you would still have made your case, because the reference to Dolsen is only one of many others, almost repetitive in their similarity.

Mr. Tavenner. In describing Earl Browder as the head of the Far East bureau, you referred to a person as his assistant who was an American woman, but did not give the name of the American woman.

General "Willoughby. Perhaps an instinctive gallantry which is not applicable in this kind of meeting. I will now fill the gap. Her name, said he reluctantly, is Katherine Harrison, "K" as In cat, "H" as in house. I am likely to misspell words in six languages, so I occasionally get confused on the subject.

Since this committee is taking me from one surprise to another — pleasant ones, I must say, as in the case of Dolsen — do you also have something on Miss Harrison?

Mr. Tavenner. The committee is in possession of information that she was the wife at one time of Earl Browder.

General Willoughby. A very interesting social relationship, I should say.

I have strayed afar a bit. The point I made is, I became interested in Shanghai through the slightly reluctant Sorge in describing these people in Shanghai, and began to spend funds furnished me by the benevolent Federal Government to find out some more.

Mr. Tavenner. I have some further questions to ask you about the Noulens group, but inasmuch as some Americans are tied up pretty closely with it in the Snanghai files, I will wait until we reach that.

General Willoughby. Very well. I will agree with you that the Noulens case is very interesting. It is a prototype of the Eisler case with respect to the abuse of legal defense.

Mr. Tavenner. Will you proceed with the Japanese group that Sorge established in Tokyo in 1933, and will you tell the committee what the Sorge report shows as to how he obtained the members for his group in Japan? You will find it on page 6 of exhibit 38.

General Willoughby. I take it you are interested in some individ- uals that Sorge recruited for his Japanese ring?

Mr. Tavenner. That is correct, but in addition, those who were assigned to him by Moscow

1190 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

General Willoughby. We will go back to Shanghai. This is a closing item of Sorge's activity. To go back to his work related to Shanghai, he has this to say :

When the orders came through, I asked for a technical aide ( radio man ) , a Japanese collaborator and a competent foreign assistant, and the services of Klausen, Miyagi, and Voukelitch were made available. I was authorized to recruit other personnel as necessary in the place where I was working.

Is this the item yon are interested in ?

Mr. Tavenner. Yes.

General Willoughby. My idea of the significance of this comment is that Sorge, when he gets a job, applies to the head office and says, "I. want certain technicians, a radio man, a Japanese collaborator, and a competent foreign assistant." If he were working for General Elec- tric or some other reputable concern, they would look at their colored pins on the map of the world and say, "We will transfer our represent- ative from Buenos Aires to some other place," and it would be done.

By analogy, the way the Kremlin-Moscow staff organization worked there was just as good. They pressed a button and summoned from a world-wide job distribution, Klausen

Mr. Tavenner. Where was Klausen obtained from?

General Willoughby. He had gone back to Russia, and they pulled him from there. The competent foreign assistant was Voukelitch, who was a French Communist in Belgrade at the time. They pulled him out, and these men converged and reported to their new jobs.

Mr. Tavenner. From where did they get the Japanese assistant?

General Willoughby. They went to California and found a Nisei, a citizen technically but not in heart, and had him report to Tokyo.

Mr. Tavenner. Does the report say Miyagi was a member of the American Communist Party?

General Willoughby. Yes. Here is what Sorge had to say about Miyagi :

Miyagi's position was identical with that of Voukelitch. He, too, was a mem- ber of a Communist Party (American), he, too, was ordered through Moscow to participate in my activities, he, too, was a Comintern member in the broad sense, he, too. was registered with and accepted by some major Moscow organi- zation as a member of my group, and in his case, too, it made absolutely no difference whether the agency in question was the Comintern, central committee of the Russian Communist Party, or the Fourth Bureau of the red army.

Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, does there appear as one of the 34 exhibits an interrogation of this individual, that is, Miyagi, relative to his knowledge of the American Communist Party?

General Willoughby. My recollection is that it does, and I be- lieve 3rou have custodianship of this exhibit.

Mr. Tavenner. Yes. I have before me exhibit 25, marked for identification only, and, Mr. Chairman, rather than introduce the whole document in evidence, I would like to read what I consider the perti- nent portions of it. I am doing this because of its length.

The following are extracts from interrogations of Miyagi Yotoku conducted in March and April of 1942. This is from volume 4 of the procurator's records on Miyagi.

Question 3. The accused will describe his activities for the Communist cause during his stay in the United States.

Answer. In about September 1D2G, I purchased a house facing Los Angeles station, and in November I opened a restaurant there. My three business part- ners (Yabe, Noritsugu; Matayoshi, Atsushi; and Nakamura, Koki), two other

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1191

acquaintances and I began to meet once a week in the dressing room at the rear of the restaurant to exchange persona] views on social sciences, philosophy, and art. This Social Problems Study Group, as we called ii, gradually ab- sorbed new members, among whom were an anarchist and close friend of Kotoku, Shusui, an Intimate Communist colleague of Katayama, Sen, and several clergy- men. In the course of time, our liberal sessions gradually veered toward I he Left, becoming completely leftist when .Marxists Herbert Harris, a Russian, and Fister, a Swiss, who had joined the circle through the introduction of Communists Yada and Takahashi of West Los Angeles early in 1927, volunteered to lecture to us on Marxian theory.

Both Yada and Takahashi had joined our circle hoping to prevail upon the members of the working class who attended it to form a Communist study group. Our meetings, therefore, were the scenes of incessant wrangling be- tween the anarchists and the Communist members. Yada and about 20 others bolted the group eventually, leaving me and about 10 others behind, set up their own .Marxist study group, and established a temporary office on Weller Street in the Japanese section of Los Angeles. Their official organ, Class Strug- gle (Kaikyusen), became the Labor News (Redo Shimbun) in about 1928.

It was around this time that Japanese Marxists began to join the American Communist Party and to participate actively in its work. At this stage, the Labor News moved to San Francisco, where Tatemono, Teiichi succeeded Yada as supervisor, and Post Street became more or less the headquarters of the Japanese division of the American Communist Party. I remained in Los An- geles and had no further association with that group.

In about 1929, I joined the Proletarian Art Society and the Japanese branch of the Red Relief Association (both organizations affiliated with the Japanese division of the Oriental People's Section of the American Communist Party). I lectured to the former on the history of fine arts, edited its magazine, and ar- ranged exhibitions, while for the latter I helped collect money to aid Commu- nists arrested by the authorities. When almost all the delegates to the party eonvention held in Los Angeles in 1930 were arrested, including seven Japanese who were served deportation notices, Hamakiyo, Yabe and I managed to gain asylum for our seven countrymen in the Soviet Union.

Toward the end of the 1930, I was visited in Los Angeles by a Communist named Yano who had just returned from Moscow with orders from the Comin- tern to build up an organization in the United States. Yano was on intimate terms with Sain Darcy, the organizer for District 13 (California). I kept in touch with him and in the autumn of 1931, he encouraged me to join the Commu- nist Party. I objected on the ground that my previous record was sufficient reason for not doing so, but he said that I should be registered with the party, and that membership would facilitate my activities. I then agreed to join and assumed the party alias of Joe. Since I was not in good health, I was excused from party meetings and a number of other activities. My chief tasks were to study the distribution of Japanese farm workers and to analyze Chinese prob- lems with the assistance of a party member named Yamada.

Though I went to assist the strikers when Yano informed me of the labor dispute at the Japanese-American News (Nichibei Shimbunsha) in San Fran- cisco in about May 1933, my work was mainly invisible.

Question 4 : Describe your current relations with the American Communist Party.

Answer : I do not think I am a member of the American Communist Party now. I said last time that YTano and a certain Caucasian approached me on the question of my returning to Japan toward the close of 1932. On that occasion, the Caucasian requested that I return within a month or so to the United States, my place of residence, which meant that I was being sent to Japan as a United States Communist Party member. He told me to contact Roy, a party member in Los Angeles whom I had known personally for some time.

Although I had consented to return to Japan, I continued to help strikers and roam about in search of suitable subjects for paintings. Roy urged me repeatedly to sail at an early date, and one day in September 1933, Yano and Roy called on me and informed me that I was to leave immediately. I em- barked around the beginning of October with instructions from Roy to return in about a month, or 3 months at the latest. I left my baggage behind because I did not expect to be away for very long.

According to Mrs. Kitabayashi, Roy called on her and her husband several times after my departure to inquire about my whereabouts and my activities.

1192 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

I believe he assumed that I was postponing my return indefinitely in order to engage in activities in Japan and arranged to have my name stricken from the register of the American Communist Party.

Question 5 : The accused will describe his relations with the Comintern.

Answer: When I joined the United States Communist Party (i. e., the Ameri- can branch of the Comintern) at Yano's request, I did not go through the usual formality of submitting a signed application ; I entrusted all the details to Yano. Since he maintained direct contact with the Comintern as the party organizer in the United States, I am certain that he registered me with the Comintern under the alias of Joe, shortly after I gave him my acceptance. Since I have been engaged in espionage work for the Comintern as a member of the Sorge ring since my return to Japan, I believe my registration is stiU effective and that I am a member of the Comintern intelligence department.

Question 6 : Were you given travel expenses and operating funds before you sailed for Japan?

Answer : Roy gave me $200 to cover travel expenses just before my departure. In addition, he handed me a dollar bill which I was to use in contacting an agent in Japan. He told me that the other man, to whom I was to present the bill, would have in his possession a similar bill bearing a successive serial num- ber. I carried it the first time I met Sorge, but we did not bother to make the comparison.

In describing further the Communist Party of the United States, Miyagi had this to say :

The headquarters of district 13 of the United States Communist Party, the California branch, is in S'an Francisco (organized by Levin Owen). Party organizations have been established in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Berkeley, Oakland, Sacramento, Fresno, San Jose, San Pedro, and other cities. Subordin- ate to the party organization are such unions, people's groups, and youth societ- ies as the following :

1. Workers International Relief.

2. Friends of the Soviet Union.

3. Anti-Imperialist League.

4. Young Pioneers of America.

5. Young Communist League of America.

6. International Labor Defense League.

7. Marine Workers Industrial Union.

8. Trade Union Unity League.

Inasmuch as these organizations, as is the case the world over, are subject to Comintern policy and direction, I shall not discuss their activities.

Further, he stated :

Participation by Japanese in party activities.

Here he names several Japanese prominent in the Communist Party in the 1920's.

Then, the last I shall read in this interrogation is what occurred, ac- cording to his deposition, in 1930 :

In this year, there were fresh developments in the party movement, the result of orders from American party headquarters calling for a new program of ex- pansion and solidification and a more vigorous policy toward the masses. ( S'am Darcy was made the organizer of district 13, the California branch.) In Cali- fornia, the party launched a campaign in the rural communities to enlist farm workers (particularly seasonal farm labor), sought to organize the marine workers, and work to strengthen the Young Communists League and Young Pioneers.

The Japanese division was absorbed by the Oriental Peoples Section and given the new mission of cooperating with the Chinese and Filipino membership.

In 1930 the Japanese division adopted the popularization of the party as its watchword and embarked upon a concrete program designed to organize farm and fishery workers. It fostered strikes in the Imperial Valley against such large capital concerns as the Gerard Co. and the Sun Fruit Co. and agitated among the fishermen and fishing industry workers in San Pedro. (Except in

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1193

isolated cases, these efforts ended in dismal failure because of the firm inter- vention of the authorities. »

A movement was also started to boycott Japanese celebrities visiting Los Angeles, specifically Bunji' Suzuki, Totsudo Kato, Toyohiko Kagawa, Tenko Nishida, Tokuzo Asahara, Shunji Tahara, Ki Kimura, and [kuo Oyama. (By arrangement with Local Foreign Otiiee officials ami Japanese-language papers,

these so-called celebrities made it a practice to defray their traveling expenses

by charging admission to lectures at wifieh they ostensibly enlightened the audi- ence on the Japanese situation. To give a few examples, Bunji Suzuki collected

several thousand dollars for three lectures delivered in Los Angeles while he was en route to an international labdr conference, and Totsudo Kato and Toyohiko Kagawa each took from $20,000 to $30,000 from needy Japanese immigrants during a week of religious lecturing. These meetings were nothing but a Cheap fraud.) Meanwhile, party members began campaigning on the streets.

The expansion of the party's sphere of activity to the streets merits praise in that it attracted public attention, but it was not without its adverse effects, one of the most noteworthy being the aggravation of the hostility of the local Japa- nese community toward the party. This blunder may be traced to lack of caution in evaluating the Japanese mind and the predominant position occupied by the traditional Japanese spirit.

As party activity started to get into full swing in May and June of 1930, the repressive hand of the American authorities tightened. In a mass arrest staged during a meeting of the Los Angeles branch in Long Beach, Comrades Hakomori, Fukunaga, Nishimura, Miyagi ( Vosaburo), Nagahama, Shima, Matayoshi, Yoshi- oka, and Teraya were taken into custody, and the Japanese division, deprived of its leading members, was brought to the verge of collapse.

General Willoughby. May I raise a question, sir?

I take it, Mr. Tavenner, that you established by these quotations that a bona fide member of the American Communist Party who was a Japanese linguist was requested by Sorge, and he got him as a push- button request in such organization, and this man has been identified as a member of the American Communist Party from district 13, the California branch.

Mr. Yki.de. Do you have any information as to where Miyagi Yotoku is now '.

Genera] Willoughby. My recollection is he died of illness, either in prison or shortly after our political amnesty in 1945.

Mr. Tavenner. I think he died in prison.

General Willoughby. He was tubercular, I believe.

Mr. Tavenner. That is right.

General Willoughby. I read this many months ago.

Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, to return to other members of the Japanese group, it would appear from Sorge's statement that other than the three individuals who he was advised would be avail- able in Tokyo when he arrived there, the rest of his Japanese group was recruited in Tokyo by Sorge?

General Willoughby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know whether that is the way in which Guenther Stein was recruited into the organization?

General Willoughby. It was.

Mr. Tavenner. What does the record disclose its to the extent of Guenther Stein"s activities in Sorge's Japanese group?

General AVilloughby. That is a very interesting figure, this Guen- ther Stein. I would prefer to read the summation of the three Ameri- can lawyers who passed on this documentation, although the docu- mentation, meaning statements to the court, on the subject of

90929—51 5

1194 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

Guenther Stein, are also in your possession. This is a matter of preserving the time of the committee. This is what the record says :

Guenther Stein, special correspondent for a London newspaper, was a regular member of the Sorge spy ring. A notebook confiscated from Sorge listed six members of this ring, together with their aliases, and Stein was listed among the six. An intercepted radio message to Moscow referred to his code name. There is testimony by Max Klausen and Sorge that Klausen, a wireless operator specialist, erected a wireless transmission set in Stein's residence to forward reports to Russia. Stein not only was living on the premises at the time, but gave his consent. Being a correspondent for a reputable English newspaper, he had various contacts which permitted him to secure valuable information. This information, passed on to Sorge, was forwarded to Russia. Stein also acted as a courier for Sorge and carried photographs and microfilm to Shanghai where they were delivered to a liaison agent from Moscow at the Metropole Hotel. On one occasion Stein was instructed to, and did bring back from Shanghai a smoking pipe of extraordinary design, a woman's shawl, and a brooch. These items,, given to him by a liaison agent from Moscow, were later used by Anna Klausen for identification purposes when she was sent to Shanghai in 1937-38 to deliver 20 to 30 rolls of film to the Moscow agent.

These are high lights. Each of the entries I have read is supported by a direct reference to a sworn statement in the course of the court interrogation.

I will add to this, again to link Stein with yesterday, as it were: When the original report was published in 1949, and prior to the protestation by Agnes Smedley, Guenther Stein disappeared. In other words, not knowing exactly what the outcome or implication of this report might be on either the public or official action, he felt it prudent to vanish.

Personally, I would be interested in how fast one can vanish. Ap- parently he procured both passport and transportation facilities to Europe in 24 hours, something which I challenge anyone of legitimate purposes and identification to accomplish.

Then he was not heard from for a couple years, until he got himself arrested by the French Police, Surete Nationale, for espionage. He later went to Poland, where he holds citizenship.

Here you have the case of a man who disappears to Europe and gets himself arrested once more for doing business at the same old stand ; namely, espionage.

Mr. Tavenner. Did he leave Japan prior to the breaking of the Sorge case ?

General Willoughby. Yes, he left, prudently, prior to the breaking of this case.

Mr. Tavenner. Did the procurator in Japan state that if he had remained in Japan he would have been indicted ?

General Willoughby. He did.

Mr. Tavenner. I regret that we cannot go further this afternoon. It will be necessary to call you back again tomorrow.

Mr. Wood. The committee will stand in recess until 10 : 30 tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon, at 4:30 p. m. on Wednesday, August 22, 1951, an adjournment was taken until Thursday, August 23, 1951, at 10 : 30 a. m.)

HEARINGS ON AMERICAN ASPECTS OF THE RICHARD SORUE SPY CASE

(Based on Testimony of Mitsusada Yoshikawa and Maj.^Gen. Charles A. Willoughby)

THURSDAY, AUGUST 23, 1951

United States House of Representatives,

Committee on Un-American Activities,

Washington, D. O.

PUBLIC HEARING

The Committee on Un-American Activities met pursuant to adjournment at 10 :45 a. m. in room 226. Old House Office Building, Hon. John S. Wood (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives John S. Wood (chair- man), Francis E. Walter, Clyde Doyle, and Harold H. Velde (ap- pearance as noted in transcript).

Staff members present : Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel ; Thomas W. Beale, Sr., assistant counsel; Louis J. Russell, senior investigator; Courtney E. Owens, investigator; Raphael I. Nixon, director of re- search ; John W. Carrington, clerk ; and A. S. Poore, editor.

Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order.

Are you ready to proceed, Mr. Tavenner ?

Mr. Tavenner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to recall General Willoughby as a witness this morning.

Mr. Wood. Very well.

Mr. Tavener. It will facilitate the handling of the introduction of the testimony if I also have Mr. Owens, an investigator of the com- mittee, sworn in, and introduce some of the documents through him, (Mid then call upon the witness for his comments.

Mr. Owens, will you take the stand, please?

Mr. Wood. Raise your right hand and be sworn, please, Mr. Owens.

You do solemnly swear that the evidence you will give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Owens. I do.

TESTIMONY OF COURTNEY E. OWENS

Mr. Tavenner. What is your name, please?

Mr. Owens. Courtney E. Owens.

Mr. Tavenner. Do you hold a position with this committee?

Mr. Owens. Yes, sir; I am employed as investigator.

1195

1196 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

Mr. Tavenner. How long have you been so employed ?

Mr. Owens. Three years.

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Owens, will you select consecutive exhibit No. 13 from the documents in front of you and examine it and describe to the committee its contents?

Mr. Owens. Yes, sir. Consecutive exhibit 13, as compiled by G-2, Far East Command, is entitled ''Foreign Affairs Yearbook, 1942." From October 1941 to October 1942, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police- Mr. Tavenner. Will you state again the nature of the document you have before you ?

Mr. Owens. This document is entitled "Foreign Affairs Yearbook, 1942. " It was compiled by the Criminal Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Justice, of the Japanese Government.

From October 1941 to October 1942, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police compiled the formerly undiscovered records of the Sorge spy ring. Assembled from a great mass of official notes, interrogations, and so forth, the Japanese collated this material and included it in pages 398 through 600 of their annual publication of the Foreign Affairs Yearbook. That is to say, pages 398 to 600 deal exclusively with the Japanese results of their investigations and interrogations in the Sorge spy case.

Described by the Home Ministry officials, the Japanese Home Min- istry officials, as a case "which may find no parallel in the history of espionage," the undercover system of the Sorge spy ring in China and Japan sought, found, and sent to Moscow over a period of 10 years top-secret plans and policies of the Japanese Government.

We have here the full English translation of that portion of the Foreign Affairs Yearbook.

Mr. Tavenner. Now, this Foreign Affairs Yearbook of 1942 iden- tified by you, pages 44 through 141 of the English translation, deals with the information accumulated by Sorge and other members of his ring and forwarded to Moscow. The first listing of his informa- tion is that obtained by Sorge through his connection with the German Embassy, I believe. The following paragraph precedes the informa- tion Sorge received through the German Embassy, which I will read :

In addition to the agents working under him, Sorge had a rich source of news in the German Embassy, where he enjoyed confidence and respect. Some of the information he obtained through the Embassy is listed below.

And there appears a considerable listing of material, and this is the general subject upon which General Willoughby testified early in the hearing yesterday.

Some indication of the accuracy of his information is contained in paragraphs 18 through 22, dealing with the Russian-German relations prior to the German attack on Russia on June 22, 1941.

Will you please read to the committee the messages relating to these negotiations?

Mr. Owens (reading) :

In March 1941, he was told by Ambassador Ott

Mr. Tavenner. When you say "he," you are referring to Sorge? Mr. Owens. Richard Sorge, yes. [Continuing reading: |

He was told by Ambassador ott that Foreign Minister Matsuoka's trip te Europe w:is being made at Hitler's invitation, and that Matsuoka \v;is author- ized by the Japanese Government to give German; certain informal guaranties.

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1 1 97

That is the basis of one message.

in the beginning of 1941, he learned from Ambassador Otl and a special German envoy senl to Japan thai the envoy's mission was to find oul whether or not there was any possibility of Japan's starting a war against the Soviet Union.

In the middle of April 1941, Ambassador Otl told him thai he was surprised by the Japanese-Russian Neutrality Pact, because German circles had been expecting a crisis between Japan and Russia. Sorge was do! surprised; he had already informed the Soviet Governmenl by radio thai one of the purposes of Matsuoka's trip to Europe was to conclude a pact with Russia.

On the occasion of Hess- flight to England in May 1941, he was told at the German Embassy that Hitler intended to make peace with England and to

flghl Russia, and that lie had sent Hess to England as a last resort. Sorge

judged that, in spite <>i' the Etusso-German Nonaggression Pact, a German attack on Russia was inevitable and even imminent.

About June 20, 1941, lie was told by Military Attache- "Schohl," who was proceeding from Germany to his new post in Siam, that Germany would launch a full-Scale attack on Russia about June 20; that the main effort would he directed against Moscow; and that from 170 to 190 divisions were concentrated on the border. Colonel Kretschmar informed him that 175 divisions were concentrated on the Russo-Gennun frontier.

Mr. Tavenner. ?Tust a moment. Kretschmar was the German mili- tary attache attached to the German Embassy in Tokyo? Mr. Owens. That is correct.

Mr. Tavenner. Then, as a result of that information, Russia learned of the impending attack by Germany on June 22, 1941.

Does that complete the messages that appear at that point?

Mr. Owens. Yes, sir.

Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, yon referred in the course of your test iuiony yesterday to certain messages that were received or sent to Moscow through this Sorge ring. But, before asking you to comment upon that, I want to ask Mr. Owens to refer to page 47, where there appears an interesting message dealing with the Japanese and German policies before the war with the United States. Do you have it?

Mr. Owens. Yes, sir.

Mr. Tavenner. Will you please read it?

Mr. Owens. It actually involves four messages. The one you had particular reference to is the last one.

Mr. Tavenner. And I would like for you also to read the message which was referred to in the testimony of Yoshikawa, when he test- ified here a week or two ago, so that we have the whole, picture as complete as possible before General YVilloughby comments upon it.

Mr. Owens. Yes, sir. [Reading:]

In June 1941. he (Sorge) learned from the members of the German Economic Mission to Japan. Wohl "Voss" and "Spinsler," that the upshot of the Ger- man-Japanese economic discussions was that Japan would receive munitions from Germany in return for rubber and petroleum and that the two countries would collaborate in the establishment of factories in Japan.

The next message :

In the beginning of July 1941 he (Sorce) was told by Ambassador Ott and Military Attache Kretschmar that it had been decided at a conference before the throne that Japan would push forward her policy of expansion to the south, hut that, at the same time, she would prepare to declare war on Russia when the opportunity presented itself.

The third message :

In July 1941. he (Sorge) learned from Ambassador Ott. from the militarv at- tache, and others that the Japanese armed forces were saying that they

1198 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

would enter the Russian war if and when Germany captured Moscow and Len- ingrad and reached the Volga ; that the enthusiasm of the Japanese Army and people for a Russian war was waning ; that Ott had had an unproductive con- versation with Tojo because the latter was not interested in military problems in the north ; and that Konoye had resigned and formed a third cabinet in order to oust Matsuoka and open the way for a new agreement with America.

The fourth message :

During July and August 1941, after receiving information concerning Japan's large-scale mobilization from Ambassador Ott and the military attache^ he came to the conclusion that there would be no war against Russia that year. His reasoning was as follows : At the end of the mobilization, approximately 30 divisions were concentrated in Manchuria. This corresponds to only one- third of the newly mobilized forces. The divisions were sent out after August 15, which means that it is too late to start a war before winter. There- fore, Japan will not fight Russia but will challenge America and England in the south.

Now, the message you have reference to, that Mr. Yoshikawa testi- fied about, was a radio sent in the beginning of October 1941, classi- fied "State secret." Do you desire me to read that at this time?

Mr. Tavenner. Yes, if you will read it again. ,

Mr. Owens (reading) :

The American-Japanese talks have entered upon their final stage. In Konoye's opinion they will end successfully if Japan decreases her forces in China and French Indochina and gives up her plan of building eight naval and air bases in French Indochina. If America refuses to compromise by the middle of October, Japan will attack America, the Malay countries, Singapore, and Sumatra. She will not attack Borneo, because it is within reach of Singapore and Manila. How- ever, there will be war only if the talks break down, and there is no doubt that Japan is doing her best to bring them to a successful conclusion even at the expense of her German ally.

That was the message that Mr. Yoshikawa testified about.

Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, will you care to comment upon the action of the Sorge ring and the transmission of these messages to Moscow ?

Mr. Walter. Before you go into that, may I ask the General a ques- tion, Mr. Chairman ?

Mr. Wood. Mr. Walter.

Mr. Walter. General, as a result of your very careful consideration of these messages, are you of the opinion that when the attack came at Pearl Harbor it came as a result of a complete understanding between Germany, Italy, and Japan ?

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. CHARLES ANDREW WILLOUGHBY—

Resumed

General Willoughby. That is a very difficult question, Mr. Walter. The relationship with Italy and Germany at that time was initially directed against the Third Communist International. It was a Comin- tern political understanding rather than a military one, if I interpret this series of messages correctly.

The fact, however, remained that at some time during the summer, under the phraseology of these messages, the Japanese Foreign Office veered away from an open military attack against Russia. And again referring to the trend of these messages over several months, you can- not take a single one and conclusively select it. You have to follow the trend of all of them.

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1199

The trend shows thai an attack- via Siberia was contemplated, and certain military divisions were made ready for it.

Then public and official military opinion changed, possibly in August, and the trend toward a movement in the south became pro- gressively apparent. When I say "progressively apparent," Sorge of course did not have any split-second service of information.. He had to rely on Ozaki, who was his leg man. into the Japanese foreign office, to keep him advised. And I notice that there are time lags of 2 to 3 weeks, even. So we may assume, then, that Sorge's mission was to determine in broad terms : Are the Russians, are the Japanese, utilizing the Manchurian or Kwantung army to attack Siberia, or is the military power of Japan going to be shifted south ? That is the strategic ques- tion, and that is the one that affects us immediately.

Once decided that the Japanese would move south in the direction of Indochina, Malaya, and so forth, a collision with the United States and England, of course, became inevitable. And had we known this in August or September or October, it is of course historically dem- onstrable that that would have been in the nature of advance warning of the war ; not advance warning toward a specific date of a specific month, but the general feeling that there is going to be a collision between the Japanese Empire and ourselves.

(Representative Harold H. Velde entered the hearing room at this point.)

And it is that report or the series of reports that are reflected in this message exchange, that brought this question forward and solved it; namely, as late as October 15, Sorge positively relayed to Moscow a general statement that "it is decided to move south, and all military preparations of the Japanese Empire are to that effect for that purpose and that intent."

Now, I take advantage of Mr. Velde's entry now in an amicable point of correction. Mr. Velde's question yesterday was practically the same as yours, Mr. Walter, this morning, except that he put it in terms of Pearl Harbor. Well, Pearl Harbor is a fixed date in a fixed month. And that does not appear in the Sorge message, and it is comparatively unimportant that it did not appear. The important thing is: Is the trend of Japanese military operations in the summer of 1941 directed to the south, meaning toward collision with the United States and England, or is it directed toward the north, in other words toward Russia? That was so important to the Russians, and inferentially would have been so important to us had we known it, that the Russians •did not dare to remove the divisions then stationed in Siberia and transfer them to the west front, where they were badly needed, until Sorge furnished that assurance. That is the historical interpretation •on a broad basis rather than a specific-date basis.

I am not sure, Mr. Walter, if that is a satisfactory answer.

Mr. Walter. Yes, that is exactly what I wanted.

General Wtilloughby. Historically we can say, without reference to December 7 or December 12, a specific date, that if we had that informa- tion in September or October that the Japanese decision was to move south, I think it would have constituted an enormous political, eco- nomic, and military warning, in which we might have gone on an alert basis or at any rate we might have been perhaps better prepared to meet the attack on the date it actually took place.

1200 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE

Mr. Velde. General, where were you stationed at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor ?

General Willoughby. I was stationed in Manila, in the same job that I have been holding for the last 13 years, namely, MaeArthurs intelli- gence officer. So, of course, this type of information was of vital importance to us. We were the outpost of America, and we were seeking desperately every clue, every nuance of public or other reperto- rial opinion, in order to determine how close this menace would come. And therefore it is an acute perception in these particular months of the year or period of the year 1941 that I am talking about.

Mr. Velde. But you had no idea at that time that Japan would attack Pearl Harbor ?

General Willoughby. This cannot be answered by a clear-cut "yes" or "no:" We had assayed, appraised, examined the position of Japan and their potential, and we knew that some movements had taken place on the Chinese mainland. But the final decisive report, like Sorge rendered to his master, Russia — he was not available to us, you see, in anything of that quality.

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, to consider further Mr. Walter's question about the notice or knowledge that Italy and Germany may have had regarding the actual plans of attack on Pearl Harbor, I may say that that question was pretty thoroughly examined, and con- siderable evidence introduced in regard to it, in the trial of Tojo and others, and the actual message is in existence between the Japanese foreign office and its ambassador in Italy, calling upon Mussolini for his consent and approval of war with the United States, although Pearl Harbor was not mentioned in any way in connection with the message. And the documents also show that as early as December 2, conversa- tions between the Japanese Ambassador, Oshima, with Hitler, indi- cated knowledge of the general plan, but no mention of Pearl Harbor.

If the committee is interested, I am pretty certain I can get the exact judgment and finding of the international military tribunal on those matters.

General Willoughby. I think Mr. Tavenner's remarks are of great importance, since he was associated with the international military tribunal in Tokyo. His work there, his superior work there, is of course well known to me as a member of the Tokyo staff. He is probably as well informed on the factors which this international tribunal searched for, as any man available at this time.

Mr. Walter. Of course, it was more than a mere coincidence that Italy was ready to declare war the moment the attack came. That is the point. In other words, they had committed themselves to make war on the United States in advance of the actual attack made by Japan. And that was merely the signal to Italy and Germany to declare war on the United States.

General Willoughby. May I ask Mr. Tavenner on this point : That came up in the tribunal. What was their decision, their verdict, on that point?

Mr. Tavenner. I would not undertake, I believe, to state what the verdict was, without consulting the record. I am not certain that I understood the question exactly.

General Willoughby. While I am not familiar with the European situation, since I am fairly integrated in the Far East since 1938,

AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1201

I would agree with you. Mr. Waller, thai the military commitments between Italy and Germany on the spot, you see, < ailed for military action together in the European theater of war, regardless of what the Japanese mighl or might not do in the Far East. Actually, the Japanese did not attack Russia. As you know, they sought instead a painful neutrality, letting us fight it out alone until 5 days before the end of the war.

Mr. Tavkxm.i:. There is no doubt hut what the terms of the tri- partite pact between the three nations committed all three to join in military force in the event of a war with the United States.

General Willoughby. Of a universal war? I believe that is so.

Mr. Walter. That is exactly the thing I was directing my attention to. So that no matter which one of the three powers made t he attack anywhere in the world, the others were committed at the same moment to make an attack with joint forces.

Mr. Tavenner. And by reason of the document which was dis- covered, as I mentioned a moment ago, Mussolini was questioned in advance to ascertain whether or not he would abide by the terms of the agreement in the event of such a war. And my recollection is that he gave unqualified approval.

Mr. Velde. Again, you have had a lot of experience, of course, in the intelligence field. And as far as I know, the only definite informa- tion you have that Russia knew that Pearl Harbor wTas to be attacked was the message of October 15 between Sorge and the Russian Gov- ernment.

General Willoughby. I dislike to correct a member of this com- mittee, of course. The message does not mention Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Velde. I realize it does not.

General Willoughby. The message mentions that a collision with America and England had become inevitable ; their move south. Now, whether they would attack Manila first or Pearl Harbor first was still in the realm of the next 8 weeks after October 15.

Mr. Velde. Well, the question I was going to ask you, General, was on the basis of your experience in the intelligence field, and it is in the nature of an opinion. Do you, in your own mind, feel that Russia knew that an attack on Pearl Harbor or any of our other possessions or Territories was imminent?

General Willoughby. I sympathize with your query, because Pearl Harbor was such a dramatic incident. But, after all, it was only one of many war actions. The collision would